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INTRODUCTION
"God bless Mommy. God bless Nanny.
God, don't punish me because I'm black." 1
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 2
Brown vs. Board of Education 3 established more than the unconstitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine in public education. Brown also
gave the importance of education a constitutional dimension. Involuntary
racial segregation creates a stigma wherever it exists which indisputably
affects a child's self-esteem and standing as an equal citizen. Yet, as
NAACP strategists understood,4 the U.S. Supreme Court probably would
not have dismantled Plessy v. Ferguson 5 because Black children felt stigmatized by having to swim in separate pools or drink from separate water
1. Sara's Prayer, in JoNATHAN KozoL, AMAzlNG GRAcE: THE LIVES OF CHILDREN
AND THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 69 (1995). Sara, who is six years old, says this prayer
every night before she goes to sleep. She lives with her adoptive mother, Charlayne, and
her five year old brother in the South Bronx. Charlayne was friends with Sara's biological
mother, who became addicted to crack cocaine during her pregnancy with Sara. Sara was
also addicted to crack at birth and still suffers the consequences of her addiction. !d. at 6566.
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
3. 347 u.s. 483.
4. See generally MARK V. TusHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-50 (1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977).
5. 163 u.s. 537 (1890) .
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fountains. 6 Although segregation in those contexts, as well as all the other
areas covered by Jim Crow, promoted the social and political subordination of Blacks and concomitant feelings of inferiority, segregated education
provided a unique type of harm.
NAACP strategists also understood that integrating public schools was
essential to achieving racial equality in America.7 While most Whites disagreed about the value of integration in public schools, they agreed with
most Blacks that education was important to all children, Black and White.
This is suggested by the general consensus that Black children were entitled
to an education even if they were separate from White children. 8 This general consensus among Whites and Blacks about the importance of education to all children undoubtedly provided some legitimacy and impetus for
the Brown Court's willingness to overrule Plessy in public education. 9
Brown also acknowledges qualitative aspects to the importance of education, which is evident from the Court's rejection of purely procedural
definitions of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example,
~he Brown Court held that equality meant more than ensuring the State
spend equal amounts of money on Black and White schools. Otherwise,
there would have been no need to overrule Plessy on the question of
whether segregation in public schools is constitutional; the Court could
merely have ordered the state to spend more money on the Black
schools. 10
6. Some of the schools for Black children did not have water fountains and the children
drank from buckets with dippers.
7. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 193. Focusing on school desegregation became the focus
of the NAACP under the leadership of Charlie Houston in 1935. Mr. Houston stated the
NAACP's view in announcing its new policy: "[Desegregation] conceives that in equalizing
educational opportunities for Negroes it raises the whole standard of American citizenship,
and stimulates white Americans as well as black." 1d.
8. Michael W. McConnell, Originalisni and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 1005-06 (1995).
9. By focusing on desegregating the public schools and relying on the importance of
education to children as a rationale for its holding, the Brown Court weakened the moral
underpinnings of its decision that would have enabled the Court to dismantle the separate
but equal doctrine in a more honest and possibly enduring way. See McConnell, supra note
8, at 1137-39 (suggesting that the focus on the importance of education and the reliance on
psychological data as evidence of the harm segregation causes Black children, created a
dilemma for Court when it wanted to end segregation in other areas).
10. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court held that a Black man had to be
admitted to an all-White state law school because there was no "separate but equal" law
school for him to attend. Although the state had created a Black law school in response to
his suit, the Court held that it was not "equal" to the White school which offered a higher
quality education with respect to its facilities, syllabus, and faculty, and enjoyed a better
reputation in the legal community. !d. at 633-34. The Sweatt decision could be read as an
indication that the Court was beginning to confront the distinction between procedural and
substantive equality, although as a factual matter, the facilities of the separate schools were
not equal. See also, Robert Allen Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegregation: An
Inquiry Into the Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L. J. 879 (1979) (suggesting that
integration is essential to racial equality).
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Further, the Court's decision in Brown implicitly foreclosed the possibility of procedural definitions of equality that would have allowed Black
children access to White schools merely to avoid the stigma of feeling inferior by being excluded without also ensuring their integration within the
school. Specifically, if Brown is read in conjunction with McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 11 decided four years earlier,
it is clear that the Court understood equality was tied to quality in intangible ways that extended beyond the blatant existence of Jim Crow in public
education.U The McLaurin Court held that a state may not segregate students within a public school on the basis of race because isolating a Black
graduate student from his White classmates interfered with "his ability to
study, to engage in discussion, and exchange views with other students, and
in general, to learn his profession." 13 Involuntary racial segregation, even
within an "integrated" public school, affects a child's ability to learn, jeopardizing the overall quality of the child's education. 14 Merely allowing
Black children into the White schools as a procedural matter would not
obviate this type of harm. 15
Some scholars have criticized Brown and its progeny for developing a
concept of integration that calls for admitting Black students to White
schools and otherwise expecting the Black students to assimilate to White
culture. 16 Assimilation, however, is dramatically at odds with the goal of
racial equality, which is the heart of Brown's mandate. Thus, just as
McLaurin and Brown together define integration to mean more than the
mere physical presence of Black students in White schools, I want to clarify
that I do not conceive of "integration" as a synonym for "assimilation." On
the contrary, an integrated environment is one in which people of all races
share equal power and have equal voices in shaping policies and making
decisions about how the environment will be structuredY
By rejecting possible procedural definitions of equality, the Brown
Court gave substantive content to the equal protection guarantee under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Consistent with McLaurin, the Brown Court envisioned full integration of Black and White students in the curriculum and
everyday activities. Brown is premised on the principles that educational
equality is essential to achieving racial equality, that a quality education for
children of all races is essential to educational equality, and that racial integration in public schools is essential to providing a quality education. Thus,
11. 339 u.s. 637 (1950).
12. !d. at 641-42.
13. !d. at 641.
14. Id. The Court recognized that appellant's teaching skills and performance would
be adversely affected by segregation from his classmates.
15. !d. at 641-42.
16. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
lntegrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 1401 (1993).
17. For further discussion of this point, see Sharon E . Rush, Beyond Admissions: Racial Equality in Law Schools, 49 U. FLA. L. REv. _ (1997) (forthcoming).
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the Brown Court was only willing to abolish segregation in public schools
because a quality education is important to every child. In addition to protecting and promoting racial equality by its holding, the Brown Court was
also making a profound statement about the importance of a quality education to a child's welfare. Certainly, both principles were essential to the
case.
Unfortunately, more recent cases that raise questions about the right
to a public education seem less willing to acknowledge the importance of
education and the importance of integration in public education. Since
Brown, the Court has held repeatedly that education is not a fundamental
right. 18 Ironically, the educational equality aspect of Brown seems to be
diminishing in importance in cases quite similar to it-cases where the children being denied equal educational opportunities are disproportionately
children of color and poor children. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Missouri v. Jenkins 19 sends the resounding message that integrating public schools is no longer a priority. Jenkins and the other postBrown decisions seriously undermine our commitment to both racial equality and educational equality as announced in Brown.
As I read Daniel Goleman's book, Emotional Intelligence,2° I thought
about the importance of emotional intelligence in the education of our children. I also thought about liow Goleman could have been one of the psychological experts for the petitioners in Brown, helping to present evidence
that a policy of involuntary segregation harms students by emotionally assaulting their hearts and by socially, economically, and politically isolating
them from the power structure dominated by White America.21 Simultaneously, I thought about how heavily criticized the Brown Court was for relying-at least, ostensibly22-on such "soft" scientific research to reach the
profound conclusion that separate is inherently unequat2 3 This criticism
18. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988); Martinez v. Bynum,
461 U.S. 321 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995) (holding constitutional equal per pupil expenditures for
White and Black students in de facto segregated schools); see also infra Part LB.
20. DANIEL GoLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MoRE
THAN IQ (1995).
21. The Brown Court focused on the harm segregation causes Black children. Segregation also harms White children who do not learn about cultural and racial diversity or principles of human equality. Indeed, segregation indoctrinates White children in the
inlportance of White supremacy and racial hatred, which angers people of color even more.
Through state sponsored racial segregation, White children are involuntarily called on to
participate in protecting and promoting institutional racism.
22. Kevin Brown, A Reply to Cummings: Are the Racial Realists Forced to Embrace the
Legal Rationale of the Liberal and Integrationist Structure?, 20 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 783
(1993).
23. Admittedly, it would have made for a stronger case, as a matter of constitutional
law, if the Brown Court had relied on equality principles alone to strike down segregation.
At the time, however, the Court may have been uncertain of the consequences of taking this
path. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1135-38.
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has been so extreme that in Jenkins, Justice Thomas argued that racial classifications are constitutional only if they serve compelling state interests
regardless of any evidence from "questionable social science research" that
a classification harms or does not harm a particular racial group. 24
However "soft" the evidence was at the time of Brown that children,
especially Black children, are demoralized by racist policies like de jure
school segregation, recent data support similar findings, including that involuntary de facto segregation also harms children. 25 Still, some people
continue to be skeptical about the validity of psychological data and this
skepticism may affect their opinions about the usefulness of a concept like
emotional intelligence. Even for these skeptics, however, Goleman's book
can be seen as offering further support for the moral principles that almost
everyone now agrees are at the heart of Brown: that involuntary racial segregation (de jure and de facto )26 is inconsistent with equality principles and
is harmful to children, especially children of color, and that education is
vitally important to children.
As a White law professor and mother of a Black little girl, I am particularly inspired by the concept of emotional intelligence as it relates to reviving the principle in Brown that a quality education is essential to the
equality concept embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Without educational equality, racial equality is an empty promise.27
Part I of this article briefly presents several major U.S. Supreme Court
decisions since Brown that raise the issue of the importance of educational
24. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that no definitive link
exists between de facto segregation and an inferior education so as to warrant a constitutional remedy); see also infra Part I.B.
25. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1186-1217 (1995) (exploring social science and psychology research that shows categorizing
people into groups promotes stereotypes that can be negative and discriminatory). I think
the equal protection clause of the Constitution supports the constitutionality of separate
schools that are voluntarily created by minority groups, but this paper focuses on involuntary segregation. Moreover, some scholars suggest that segregation (as part of a separatist
movement, for example) cannot be truly voluntary, given the social, economic, and political
forces that promote White hegemony. See, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School Segregation, SO MINN. L. REv.
795, 808 (1996) ("[T]he issue really is whether such a 'choice' can be called voluntary if it
results from a need to escape racism and racists.").
26. In his concurrence in Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 21417 (1973), Justice Douglas recognized that the consequences of de jure and de facto segregation are equally pernicious.
27. As others have pointed out, integrating schools alone will not end the institutional
racism in our country. For example, efforts must also be made to end segregation in housing, especially since school populations are derived largely from the concept of neighborhood schools. See Forum - In Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and
Education, 80 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1996) (examining the connection between discrimination
in housing and education and its effects on children). Moreover, even if racial equality
could be achieved in education and housing, institutional racism would have to be eliminated throughout society before racial equality is achieved.
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equality, especially for students of color. The cases illustrate a waning
commitment to racial and educational equality by denying that a quality
education is important to children, by denying that all children are entitled
to a free public education, and by denying the importance of racial integration in public schools. Part II describes major skills that are characteristic
of people with high emotional intelligence and briefly relates the importance of those skills to developing a deeper understanding of the dynamics
of racism. Specifically, it explores how emotional intelligence skills are relevant to constitutional claims that children are entitled to equal educational opportunities and attempts to demonstrate that employment of high
emotional intelligence skills to the more recent cases would have promoted
the values announced in Brown. Finally, Part III suggests specific ways we
can renew our commitment to racial and educational equality by assuming
leadership roles that promote these goals.
My goal in this article is modest, but my message is urgent. I want to
inspire a discussion ·about emotional intelligence, integrated schools, and
the connections between these two goals, especially with regard to promoting racial equality and eliminating racism. I do not suggest that the concept
of emotional intelligence is the antidote for all of society's ills or that
school integration alone will dismantle White hegemony. What I do suggest is that a "quality education," informed by Brown, is not possible without integration. Education teaches more than math and verbal skills; it
fosters emotional skills as well. Furthermore, a full set of emotional talents
cannot be gained in the context of involuntary segregation. These insights
into the connections between education and emotional intelligence can be
helpful in understanding and healing racial divisions in our society, and in
providing a means to eliminate some of the forces that contribute to social,
economic, and racial inequality.
I.
THE

GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH EDUCATIONAL AND
RACIAL EQUALITY

A.

Beyond Desegregation: The Jurisprudence of Quality and Access

Since Brown, the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving questions about the meaning of Brown's desegregation mandate.
Many of these cases have focused on busing issues and on how best to
implement the goals of Brown.28 Another set of cases has addressed the
28. See, e.g., Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), affd sub nom.
Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958) (reaffirming the holding of Brown, 358 U.S. at 17, that desegregating the public schools was required
for racial equality and that states could not "ingeniously or ingenuously" act to delay integration); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-70: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978).
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issue of the importance of education outside the classic desegregation context. This sub-set of post-Brown cases was brought by plaintiffs in two different situations. Some plaintiffs alleged they were denied what Brown
arguably guaranteed to every child: a free public education of equal quality to the public education given to other children. Other plaintiffs alleged
that they were disqualified from receiving a free public education because
of unconstitutionally imposed eligibility requirements.

1.

Equal Education: Ignoring "Quality"

The Court dealt first with the quality issue, which arose in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 29 In Rodriguez, the Court refused to give heightened scrutiny to a Texas statutory scheme that produced disparities in school districts' per-pupil expenditures because they
were based on property taxes. As a result of the financing scheme, poorer
children (most of whom were Mexican-American) annually received $238
less per pupil for their education than did wealthier children (most of
whom were white). 30
Representing the state of Texas, Charles Alan Wright argued that federalism principles protected state and local governments' autonomy to devise and administer their public school financing plansY When Justice
Douglas asked Mr. Wright about the relevancy of the petitioners' race and
ethnicity to the equal protection claim, Mr. Wright admitted that race was a
factor in the case. 32 However, he argued that any relationship between
petitioners' wealth status and · their race or ethnicity was "merely
happenstance. " 33
At least five Justices were persuaded by Mr. Wright's characterization
of the irrelevancy of race and ethnicity in Rodriguez, which remarkably
faded out of the picture.34 Building on the premises that poor people are
not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right, the Court held
29. 411 u.s. 1 (1973).
30. /d. at 12-13.
31. Id. at 40.
32. Charles Alan Wright, Oral Argument, in MAY IT PLEASE THE Cou RT 325 (Peter
Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds. 1993).
33. /d. ("Although it is of course quite true that in the Edgewood School District in

Bexar County, Texas, the great majority of the students are of Spanish origin, and not as
much money is spent there as in other school districts, [we doubt] that this would be found
to be true as a general matter; ...that it is, in other words, a happenstance."). See also
PETER IRONS, THE CouRAGE OF THEIR CoNVIcrioNs 288-89 (1988) (describing the course
of the oral argument).
34. Appellants asserted that the lower court had "ignored, quite properly, the claim of
discrimination against Mexican-Americans." Appellants' Brief at 4, Rodriguez (No. 711332). According to appellants, heightened scrutiny should not be applied to the school
financing scheme because wealth is not a suspect classification. Id. at 29. The correlation
between wealth and race was, once again, ignored. /d. at 9-38. This is consistent with the
view held by many Hispanic scholars that Hispanics are largely invisible in American government and policy decisionmaking. See, e.g. , Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making
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that the scheme merely had to be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Expressing its concern about the impropriety of judicial intrusion
into educational policy decision making, which is best left to local governments, the Court concluded that the plan "was not so irrational as to be
invidiously discriminatory." 35 The Court suggested that a scheme or law
that totally denied some children a free public education, as opposed to the
scheme at issue which ensured every child an education that taught them
the basic minimal skills, might violate equal protection.
The Rodriguez Court's failure to rely on the similarities between Rodriguez and Brown is odd. The cases are similar because they were brought
on behalf of minority children in efforts to secure their rights to a free,
quality public education. While Brown focused specifically on the rights of
Black children, Rodriguez was a class-action brought on behalf of poor
children and minority children, most of whom were Mexican-American. In
fact, Mexican-American students comprised approximately 90% of the student population in Texas' poorest school district, compared to approximately 18% of the student population in Texas' most affluent school
district. 36 Mexican-American children, like other children, are entitled to
equal protection.
Moreover, Rodriguez is like Brown because everyone involved in
Brown knew that neighborhoods were segregated and that gross disparities
existed in school expenditures for Black and White pupils. 37 Perhaps the
best descriptions of the differences which existed between Black and White
schools is written by Richard Kluger in his book, Simple Justice. The following passage describes the results of a field investigation of the schools in
Clarendon, South Carolina, which was done in preparation for a suit
Thurgood Marshall was bringing on behalf of the NAACP:
The total value of the buildings, grounds, and furnishings of the
two white schools that accommodated 276 children was four times
as high as the total for the three Negro schools that accommodated a total of 808 students. The white schools were constructed
of brick and stucco; the colored schools were all wooden. At the
white elementary school, there was one teacher for each 28 children; at the colored schools, there was one teacher for each 47
children...Besides the courses offered at both schools, the curriculum at the white high school included biology, typing, and bookkeeping; at the black high schools, only agriculture and home
economics were offered. There was no running water at one of
of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965 (1995) (examining how Latinos are made "invisible" in certain contexts); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1139 (discussing the inability of noncitizens to affect change in immigration laws).
35. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
36. !d. at 25 n.60.
37. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 764.
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the two outlying colored grade schools and no electricity at the
other one. There were indoor flush toilets at both white schools
but no flush toilets, indoors or outdoors, at any of the Negro
schools-only outhouses ...38
The report continued and pointed out that the Black schools did not have
drinking fountains and that the Black children had to get water from buckets with dippers; that Black children had no bus tran~portation to school;
that Black schools had no lunchrooms or auditoriums; that the Black
schools had no janitorial service because the parents were expected to
clean the schools; and finally, at one Black school there were no desks for
the children. Everything the Black students lacked, the White students
were given. 39 The plight of Black schools during Jim Crow was dramatically characterized by poverty and racism. Thus, to move beyond Plessy
and hold that de jure racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional, the Brown Court willingly ignored the disparities in expenditures
between Black and White pupils and assumed they were equal. In contrast,
the Rodriguez Court willingly ignored race to hold that a school financing
scheme that results in disparities in per pupil expenditures is constitutional.
In Rodriguez, where the litigants sought equality outside the context of
integration, the primary focus shifted from race to wealth, even though the
public schools involved were de facto involuntarily racially identifiablethat is, separate and unequal. This shift is inconsistent with both the theoretical and factual underpinnings of Brown.
While this shift reflects the strategic risk the Brown litigants faced in
assuming equal per pupil expenditures, those involved in Brown probably
did not realize the course they were charting and the ultimate dilemma
they might face. This dilemma can be characterized as a hybrid Brown/
Rodriguez case, i.e., a case in which the plaintiffs are predominantly Black
and poor, the per pupil expenditures really are equal (or better for Blacks),
the schools remain involuntarily racially segregated because of economic
demographics, and the students continue to suffer the harms associated
with being politically isolated and excluded from White society's power
structure.40 The dilemma posed by Brown and Rodriguez becomes dramatically apparent in Jenkins. Ironically, by ignoring the race of the plaintiffs
in Rodriguez, the Court may have inadvertently limited itself in Jenkins by
having to choose either to acknowledge explicitly that a quality education is
essential to the holding in Brown and integration of all races is essential to
38. !d. at 332.
39. !d.
40. See john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80
MINN. L. REv. 749, 790-91 (1996) ("The demoralization experienced in urban, segregated
schools is difficult to overcome, and more computers and books alone do not break down
this feeling of abandonment."). Compare this with Goleman's concept of "emotional literacy," arguing that teaching our children mere basic skills may not be enough to prepare
them to survive in the modem world. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 231.
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quality-issues the Court did not reach in Rodriguez-or, alternatively, to
back away from Brown's goal of racial equality as promoted through integration of public schools.
The risky route taken in Brown will have paid off only temporarily if
the Court is unwilling to uphold the principles of racial and educational
equality. Moreover, if the Court fails to promote the goal of integration of
public schools, which is one possible reading of Jenkins, then Rodriguez
provides some basis for an even greater abandonment of our commitment
to children's education. In a world where wealth (or poverty) silently substitutes for race, and the relationship between the two is seen as "happenstance" and continues to be ignored, 41 separate and unequal will prevail.
2.

Equal Access: The Authority to "Disqualify"

Within two years of Rodriguez, the Texas legislature passed a law
seemingly designed to test the sincerity of the Court's dicta that a state has
an obligation to provide an education, however slight, to its children. 42 A
class action suit brought on behalf of minority children and poor children
presented the Court in Plyler v. Doe43 with the question whether a Texas ·
statute that denied free public education to children who had not been "legally admitted" into the United States violated their equal protection. 44
Although the Court repeated its holding in Rodriguez that education is not
a fundamental right45 , the Plyler Court nevertheless subjected the statute
to intermediate scrutiny.46 Central to the Court's ruling that the statute
violated equal protection was the Court's belief in the educational equality
principle essential to Brown. Like all nine Justices in Brown, at least five
Justices in Plyler upheld the principles of racial and educational equality:
[Illiteracy] is an enduring disability. The inability to read and
write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education
each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological
well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual
achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile [a] status-based
denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. 47
41. See supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
42. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
43. 457 u.s. 202 (1982).
44. ld. at 205.
45. ld. at 223.
46. "[C]ertain forms of legislative classifications, while not fatally invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these linlited circumstances we have
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the
ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State." ld. at 217.
47. ld. at 222 (footnote omitted).
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This passage from Plyler echoes, with matching force, the sentiments of
Brown presented at the beginning of this essay.
The Plyler Court has been heavily criticized for overstepping its authority and creating rights nowhere stated or implied in the Constitution. 48
As Professor Michael Perry wrote just after the decision: "The difficult
question with respect to the Plyler decision, then, is not whether the Court
gave the right answer. Of course it did ... The difficult question, rather, is
whether it was right for the Court to give the answer. " 49 Cases following
Plyler, however, may put to rest the accusation that the Court is overstepping its authority in this area. To the contrary; for many legal scholars and
practitioners, these post-Plyler cases suggest that the Court has abdicated
its responsibility under Brown to protect the equal protection rights of
children.
Martinez v. Bynum50 is typical of the post~Plyler jurisprudence. In this
case, only the late Justice Marshall considered unconstitutional a Texas
statute that disqualified eight-year-old Roberto Morales from receiving a
free public education. 51 Roberto's parents lived in Mexico, but sent him to
live with his sister in McAllen, Texas, the place of his birth, so that he could
receive an education. Unfortunately for Roberto, Texas denied a free education to any child who lived in Texas for the sole purpose of receiving an
education. Eight Justices upheld the statute as a bona fide residence requirement that was rationally related to the state's interest in protecting its
resources. 52 Similarly, when nine-year-old Sarita Kadrmas and her
younger siblings could not afford to pay a fee to ride on the bus to the
public school 16 miles away, the Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools 53 upheld as rational the state's financing scheme that resulted in
poorer families losing their bus subsidies. 54 It is worth emphasizing that
the statutes in both Martinez and Kadrmas had the intentional effect of
potentially denying children like Roberto and Sarita a free public
education.5 5
48. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U . PA. L. REv. 1257 (1984) (reviewing VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER CouRT: THE CouNTER-REvOLUTION THAT
WASN'T (1983), and suggesting that the majority opinion is devoid of either coherent or
significant legal analysis and instead represents a piecemeal attempt at gaining consensus);
Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 329, 329
(1983) (insisting that the Plyler decision was "unmistakably and fundamentally activist in
character").
49. Perry, supra note 48, at 344 (emphasis in original).
50. 461 u.s. 321 (1983).
51. Id. at 334.
52. Id. at 333.
53. 487 u.s. 450 (1988).
54. Id. at 461.
55. See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text, for a discussion of role of intent in
proving race discrimination.
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Together, Rodriguez, Martinez, and Kadrmas demonstrate a significant retreat from our commitment as a nation to ensuring that all children
receive a free quality education-a commitment that was at the heart of
Brown. Why was it not relevant in Rodriguez, Plyler, and Martinez that the
plaintiffs were of Mexican-American descent? Rodriguez and Plyler, after
all, were class actions brought on behalf of minority and poor children, and
the statute in Martinez seemed to be targeted at Mexican children residing
in Texas. Ironically, Roberto was a United States citizen and had been
born in the very town that had excluded him. The value of "citizenship" to
minorities in our country's history has had enormous implications. In Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 56 Scott was denied citizenship (even though he was an
emancipated slave) and thus denied access to the legal system. Remarkably, even more than 100 years after the Supreme Court overruled Dred
Scott in the Slaughter-House Cases, 57 U.S. citizenship is not enough to secure Roberto's right to a free public education. 58 1t seems that an acknowledgement of the plaintiffs' race and ethnicity would have triggered strict
scrutiny and required an analysis in Rodriguez and Martinez forcing Texas
to explain how its laws served compelling interests. A serious acknowledgement of the plaintiffs' race and/or ethnicity in Plyler arguably would
have put it beyond federalism's grasp and provided greater security to both
the racial equality and educational equality principles of Brown. By failing
to take the race/ethnicity road in Plyler, the Supreme Court invited legislation like that in California's Proposition 187, which denies free public education to children like those in Plyler. 59 Plyler, a five to four decision,
could very well be reversed if Proposition 187 advocates have their day in
court.60
3.

Equal Access: The Lack of Authority to "Disqualify"

It is common for officials at colleges and universities to rely on standardized exams to determine which applicants are eligible for admission to
their schools. Significantly, many standardized tests, including IQ tests,
have been shown by credible studies to be biased against historically
marginalized groups like African-Americans, Hispanics, women, and poor
56. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 427 (1857).
57. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 26, 60 (1873) (holding that the 14th Amendment explicitly
granted "citizenship" to emancipated slaves).
58. I am thankful to Carter Andersen for this observation.
59. CAL. EDuc. CoDE § 48215 (Deering 1996) (Proposition 187, Section 7. Exclusion
of Illegal Aliens from Public Elementary and Secondary Schools); CAL. EDuc. CoDE
§ 66010.8 (Deering 1996) (Section 8. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Post-secondary
Educational Institutions).
60. Recently, the United States District Court for the Central District of California
struck down section 7 of Proposition 187 (excluding illegal aliens from public elementary
and secondary schools), relying partially on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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people, to list a few. 61 In fact, the Supreme Court recently noted in United
States v. Fordice 62 that standardized tests can be used in unfair ways.
Fordice arose in the context of plaintiffs who were students at predominantly Black universities in Mississippi. They alleged that Mississippi had
failed to dismantle its dual university system for Black and White students
in violation of their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 63
Historically, Mississippi used scores on the American College Testing
Program (ACT) to determine eligibility for admission to its state universities and colleges. Eligibility for one of the four predominantly White institutions required an ACT score of 15 or higher. 64 Both lower courts found
the "discriminatory taint" of this requirement obvious, because when it was
initially adopted in 1963, the average ACT score for Whites was 18 and for
Blacks it was 7. 65 State officials took advantage of the built-in racial and
cultural biases of the ACT and set-cut-off scores for "automatic" admission
to the White universities accordingly. 66 As a practical matter, then, Black
applicants were deemed "unqualified" for admissions to the predominantly
White colleges and had no choice but to attend a predominantly Black
college. 67
In 1985, the university system remained largely segregated. 68 Admissions officials continued to place determinative weight on ACT scores for
admission to the predominantly White universities, knowing that 72% of
Whites achieved this score, but less than 30% of Blacks did. 69 The Court
held that continued reliance solely on ACT scores to set automatic admissions requirements was traceable to adoption of the original admissions
policy. Because the automatic admissions policy still had segregative effects, the Fordice Court ordered admissions officials to look at other indicia
of a student's ability to succeed. 70 Specifically, the Court noted that placing more weight on students' grades would result in the admission of more
Black students to the predominantly White colleges. 71 Without actually
61. Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121,
131 (1993) (citing STEVEN J. GouLD, MisMEASURE OF MAN (1981)).
62. 505 u.s. 717 (1992).
63. They also alleged violations of their Fifth, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights
as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 723 (1992).
64. Admission to Mississippi University for Women generally required an ACT score
of 18. Id. at 734-35.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 734-35.
68. Id. at 735 (noting that, at the time of the opinion (1992), Mississippi's universities
remained "predominantly identifiable by race").
69. Id. at 735.
70. Id. at 738.
71. The Court relied on information provided by the American College Testing Program, the organization that administers the ACT, which discourages reliance on ACT scores
as the sole criterion for college admissions.
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telling admissions officials that they must take grades into account, the
Court nevertheless held that they must eliminate the use of standardized
exams as the sole criterion for automatic admission. The state could not
show "that the 'ACT-only' admission standard is not susceptible to elimination without eroding sound educational policy. "72
Despite evidence that most standardized tests are biased, many people
responsible for evaluating applicants for employment opportunities or educational programs continue to rely on them, sometimes accounting for the
built-in biases and sometimes discounting them. The confusion over the
appropriateness of relying on standardized tests to measure an applicant's
qualifications for a particular state program is somewhat understandable
because the Supreme Court itself is unclear about their role in equal pro- .
tection analysis. Compare Fordice with the Court's analysis in Washington
v. Davis73 where it found that the state did not discriminate against Black
applicants by requiring that they obtain a certain minimum score on a standardized exam to qualify for police officer positions. 74 Plaintiff's research
revealed that Black applicants were four times more likely than White applicants to score below the minimum requirement.75 Because the state did
not intend to discriminate against Black applicants by relying on the test
scores to measure qualifications for the job, the Court found that disparate
impact alone was insufficient to establish race discrimination. 76 The Davis
principle requiring proof of discriminatory intent, a nearly impossible task
now that states are better at disguising racial discrimination, sanctions the
use of standardized test scores that are knowingly biased against particular
groups-usually people of color.
A measure of intelligence that relies less on IQ-type tests and more on
other indicia of ability to succeed minimizes the harm reliance on such tests
causes individuals and groups of people who do not perform as well on
them. In addition, such a measure of intelligence also offers hope that we,
as a society, will not miss what Goleman calls "windows of opportunity" 77
for creating a more harmonious, productive, and democratic society. The
situation in Fordice presented just such an opportunity and the Court rose
to the challenge. Certainly, as the Fordice Court acknowledged, reliance
The record...indicated that the disparity between black and white students' high
school grade averages was much narrower than the gap between their average
ACT scores, thereby suggesting that an admissions formula which included grades
would increase the number of black students eligible for automatic admission to all
of Mississippi's public universities.
!d. at 737.
72. !d. at 738.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

426 u.s. 229 (1976).
!d.
Id. at 237.
!d. at 246.
GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 199.
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on biased tests to evaluate an applicant is inconsistent with principles of
equality and fairness.
B.

The Road to Involuntary Re-Segregation

Cases like Rodriguez, Plyler, Martinez, and Kadrmas do not tell the
whole story about the paling of Brown and our growing lack of commitment to children and education, especially children of color and their education. Helping to complete the picture are cases like Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke78 and Missouri v. Ienkins. 79 Ironically,
government efforts in both cases to promote the integration of public
schools, one of which was a predominantly White medical school, and the
other a predominantly Black school district, were struck down by the
Supreme Court. These cases are important because they acknowledge race
as a factor in the holdings, although in a way that is just as dramatically at
odds with Brown as the cases that ignored race. Bakke and Jenkins explicitly quell the notion that racial equality matters in any significant way in
analyzing the constitutionality of state laws that touch on issues at the intersection of race, wealth, education, and equality.
Moreover, it is appropriate to make a comparative analysis of these
cases despite the fact that one involves a professional school and the other
involves elementary and high schools. The Supreme Court continually fails
to distinguish these two types of schools in its jurisprudence on education.
For example, the bona fide residence requirement upheld in Martinez relied on the precedent set in cases like Starns v. Malkerson 80 where states
charged higher tuition to out-of-state residents enrolled in state universities
and colleges. 81 One obvious and significant difference between the two
types of schools is that a professional school is an optional choice for a
student, while attendance in public schools through a certain age or grade
level is required by state law. In fact, the Supreme Court itself acknowledged the difference between voluntary and involuntary participation in a
state program by holding in Bazemore v. Friday82 that a state did not have
to integrate its 4-H program because participation in it was voluntary.
By noting in Bazemore that one factor diluting the constitutional requirement to integrate is that participation is voluntary, the Court implied
that when participation is required by the state, the Constitution's equal
protection guarantees are stronger. Yet, this distinction failed to carry the
vote in Martinez which resulted in upholding a state law that totally excluded Roberto and other children from the public schools when other children their age were required to be in school and could attend the public
78. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
79. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
80. 401 U.S. 985 (1971), affg wlo op., 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), cited in Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328 n.6 (1983).
81. !d.
82. 478 u.s. 385 (1986).

1997]

EDUCATION & RACE

17

schools for free. In other words, if anything, Bazemore would have supported constitutional protection of Roberto's right to an education in Martinez. Most importantly, when the issue is integrating historically White
educational institutions, a comparative analysis of policies that promote integration at all levels seems more apt, if not entirely appropriate, because
of the importance of education and racial equality in our society. In this
way, Bazemore should not be extended to public educational institutions.
].

Affirmative Integration Plans Rejected

In Bakke, the Court held unconstitutional a U.C. Davis Medical
School affirmative action admissions policy that set-aside 16 of 100 seats in
the class for applicants who self-identified as African-American, Native
American, Asian, or Chicano.83 Davis tried to justify its policy by asserting
that members of the targeted groups were underrepresented in medical
school and that their presence was essential to remedy past societal discrimination, to provide a diverse environment, and to increase the number
of doctors who were likely to provide services to patients within those
groups. 84 Allan Bakke, a White man, successfully persuaded the Court that
the Davis plan was a form of reverse race discrimination and that it denied
him, an innocent victim, equal protection. 85 An essential element of
Bakke's claim was that applicants of color who were admitted under the
policy were less qualified than he. 86
Recall that the Supreme Court's puzzling position in Fordice and Davis on the constitutionality of using biased standardized exams as a means
of assessing qualification. Bakke arguably only adds to the confusion. Allan Bakke's central claim of reverse discrimination was the fact that his
MCAT scores were higher than those of applicants admitted under the affirmative integration policy.
The Bakke Court left open the question whether benign racial classifications, that is, classifications designed to help minorities, should be subject
to strict scrutiny like other racial classifications.87 Underlying the Court's
17 year struggle with this issue is the fundamental question whether the
Constitution is color-blind as suggested by Justice Harlan in his dissenting
opinion in Plessy. 88 Although a majority of the Justices have not explicitly
adopted Harlan's language89 (which arguably has been taken out of context
83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
84. Id. at 306.
85. Id. at 310.
86. ld. at 277 ("In both years [in which Mr. Bakke applied to the medical school],
applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT
scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.").
87. 438 U .S. at 294.
88. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind.").
89. Jenkins, 155 S.Ct. 2038, 2066. Justices who have adopted Justice Harlan's "colorblind" language include Justice Thomas, concurring in Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2598
(1994), denying relief to Black plaintiffs suing Beckly County, Georgia for federal Voting
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in any event),90 the effect of the Bakke Court's holding, and more recently,
the Court's holding in Adarand Canst., Inc. v. Pena that benign racial classifications are to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, is consistent
with Justice Harlan's philosophy. 91 Recently, a federal court in Hopwood
v. Texas invoked color-blind rhetoric92 and the strict scrutiny standard93 to
hold that race may not be considered for purposes of creating diversity in a
public law school. 94 As Justice Blackmun stated in Bakke, "I suspect that it
would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially
neutral way and have it successful." 95
The snag in this debate is not the level of review applied to test the
constitutionality of affirmative action policies. Rather, the problem lies in
the Court's retreat from Brown's principle that the state has a compelling
interest in providing a quality education to children of all races and ethnicities. Integration is essential to achieve this goal.
2.

Brown Rejected?

Missouri v. Jenkins, 96 a classic desegregation case, seems to bring us
full circle. The Jenkins Court faced the question whether the district court
supervising a desegregation order had the authority, among other things, to
Rights Act (1965) violations: "The assumptions upon which our vote dilution decisions
have been based should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind
Constitution." Justice Stewart implicitly adopted the color-blind theme dissenting in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1979), which upheld federal programs that favored
certain qualifying Minority Business Enterprises: "Under our Constitution, any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently
suspect and presumptively invalid."
Justices who have rejected this "color-blind" language include Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482: "As a threshold matter, we reject the
contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion"; and Justice Brennan, writing in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
355 (1978): "The position that [differences in color or creed] must be 'constitutionally an
irrelevance,' Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring),
summed up by the shorthand phrase '[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,' Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), has never been adopted by this Court as
the proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." See also infra note 91 and accompanying text, for a discussion of how "color-blindness" has influenced decisions in education
and public accommodation.
90. T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson:
Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 961 (positing that Justice
Harlan's vision of a colorblind society was rooted in the general concept of the privileges
associated with citizenship and not with the concept of equality embodied in the equal protection clause).
91. Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995).
92. 78 F.3d 932, 957 (5th Cir. 1996) (referring to a "race-blind" admissions system).
93. !d. at 940.
94. !d. at 944.
95. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
96. 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995). For an illuminating analysis of Missouri v. Jenkins, see Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced
Desegregation, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 597 (1996).
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order that the state continue to fund quality education programs in the
Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD). In the mid-1950s the enrollment of Black students in KCMSD was 18.9% and by the 1983-84
school year, the Black population in the school district was 67.7% 97 • At
least 24 schools in the district had Black student populations of over 90%,
due primarily to "white-fiight" 98 following the initial desegregation order. 99
As part of the desegregation order, the district court decided to create
a magnet school plan to lure White students back into the district. Massive
amounts of money (over $540 million) were ordered for capital improvements100 and the per pupil expenditures in KCMSD were significantly
greater under the plan than they were in neighboring districts. 101 Despite
all the expenditures, however, students in KCMSD continued to achieve
scholastically "at or below national norms at many grade levels." 102 This
was the reason the district court ordered the quality education programs be
continued. The Supreme Court held in a five to four vote that the district
court exceeded its authority. Quoting from a previous desegregation case,
Freeman v. Pitts 103 , the Jenkins Court repeated that the "ultimate inquiry is
'whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s] complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable."'104 Accordingly, the district court's job was to decide "whether the reduction in
achievement by minority students attributable to prior de jure segregation
has been remedied to the extent practicable." 105 Because the district court
failed to identify the correlation between the continuing segregation coupled with low achievement test scores and the history of racial discrimination, it erred in assuming such a correlation existed. 106
Admittedly, Jenkins poses very difficult and complex questions ayd
understandably, the state must be frustrated that it literally has poured millions and millions of dollars into improving the physical facilities and academic programs of the Black schools only to have the problem of racial
segregation persist. In some ways, Jenkins vividly exposes the underlying
strategy of the Brown litigation team: The litigation team knew that simply
putting equal (even more) amounts of money into the Black students'
97. 115 S.Ct. at 2062 {Thomas, J., concurring).
98. Another example of drastic demographic shifts attributable to "white flight" is the
changes in enrollment in the city of Boston's public schools between 1972 and 1995. In
1972, 54,000 (or 60%) of the 90,000 students were white; but in 1995 only 11,340 (or 18%) of
the 63,000 students were white. J. Anthony Lukas, The Need for a Tougher Kind of Heroism, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996 at 48.
99. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2063.
100. Id. at 2044.
101. Id. at 2054.
102. ld. at 2055 (quoting the District Court).
103. 503 u.s. 467 (1992).
104. Jenkins , 115 S. Ct. at 2049.
105. Id. at 2055.
106. ld. at 2055.
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schools was not enough to solve the moral and social dilemma of involuntary racial segregation. This is why they asked the Brown Court to assume
procedural equality existed between the Black and White schools. Advocates, members of Congress, 107 the Court, social science experts, and probably many other members of society knew and understood that more than
procedural equality was needed to secure equal educational opportunities
for Black children at the time of Brown. Given this, why are we surprised
that efforts to equalize educational inequalities with money alone continue
to be unsuccessful in dismantling the institutional racism that the separate
but equal philosophy protects and promotes?
All of these cases, especially Jenkins, 108 are marked departures from
Brown and reflect our waning commitment as a society to guaranteeing a
free, quality public education to Black children, children of other colors,
and poor children. If this pillar of Brown is removed, then the foundation
that supports the importance of education also crumbles. If our commitment to Black children wanes and eventually disappears behind the cloak
of "race neutrality," 109 there is little hope that our commitment to all children, including White children, children of other colors, and poor children
will ever become firmly established.
The retreat from Brown reflects the growing racial divisiveness in our
country. Undoubtedly, there are many reasons for this growing divide.
Rather than explore all those reasons, this paper attempts to offer some
suggestions about how we can work together as a united people of different
races to remove the barriers that keep us at a distance from each other.
Consistent with this goal, Parts II and III explore the concept of emotional
intelligence and suggest ways in which skills consistent with high emotional
intelligence can help us begin to understand the dynamics of racism. They
107. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1139.
108. Since Jenkins (decided June 1995), efforts have been made to undo mandatory
desegregation (by abandoning mandatory busing, ending court supervision of school desegregation plans, or returning to neighborhood schools even if results would create involuntarily racially identifiable schools) in the state of Florida and in the following cities:
Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis, Louisville, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Wilmington. James S. Kunen, The End of Integration, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at 38.
As this article was in its final editing stage, four scholars at Harvard University published a study that explore in great depth the resegregation of American public schools. See
GARY 0RFIELD, MARK D . BACHMEIER, DAVID R. JAMES, AND TAMELA EITLE, DEEPENING
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1997).
109. Interestingly, Justice Harlan's "color-blind" language has been used to both support and weigh against the message of Brown. Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1971) ("[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to
control school assignment plans by directing that they be 'color blind'; that requirement,
against the background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board
of Education.") with Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 287-88 (1963) ("[The argument that the
Constitution permits discrimination in public accommodation based on race] does not do
justice to a Constitution which is color blind and to the Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, which atfumed the right of all Americans to public equality".). See also supra
note 89, for a list of Justices that favor and disfavor the color-blind rhetoric.
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demonstrate the advantages of developing emotional intelligence skills,
which can help us create the kind of environment where children of all
colors can achieve success. The racial divisions in our society can only heal
if our children are educated.
II.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, EDUCATION, AND RACE:
EDUCATING OURSELVES AND OUR CHILDREN IN THE
"ART OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS"

"Being able to manage emotions in someone else is the core of
the art of handling relationships.'mo
A.

Multiple Meanings of Intelligence

We live in the era of the gene. Almost daily we hear or read about a
new study being conducted to determine whether various traits and behaviors are caused by genetics. Some genetic research is aimed at finding cures
for diseases, a goal whose value is difficult to dispute when curing people
from diseases seems humane and caring. On the other hand, some genetic
research seems to be undertaken, not to help people, but rather to absolve
society from feeling obligated to help people. 111 For example, in their popular book, The Bell Curve, authors Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray
propose that African-Americans, as a group, are disproportionately at the
lower end of the socio-economic scale because they are intellectually inferior to Whites. 112 The authors propose, among other things, that remedial
education programs be discontinued presumably because they are wasted
on people who have limited genetic capabilities for achieving academic success.U3 Thisapparently irresistible drive to find genetic links to many phenomenon-from criminal conduct114 to intelligence115 to sexual
110. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 112.
111. For a fuller explication of this point, see DoROTHY NELKIN & M. SusAN LINDEE,
THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CuLTURAL IcoN (1995).
112. RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1995).
113. Id. at 441-42. (Herrnstein and Murray suggest "[r]eallocat[ing] some portion of
existing elementary and secondary school federal aid away from programs for the disadvantaged to programs for the gifted."). This should remind us of Arthur Jensen's suggestion
that Head Start is a waste of time for Black children.
114. See, e.g., Peter Maass, Conference on Genetics and Crime Gets Second Chance,
WAsH. PosT, Sept. 22, 1995, at Bl (announcing the rescheduling of a conference called "The
Meaning and Significance of Research on Genetics and Criminal Behavior" after a similar
conference planned for 1992 was cancelled due to protest from scholars and civil rights
activists); Richard W. Stevenson, Researchers See Gene Link to Violence, But Are Wary,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 29 (discussing researchers' finding of "tentative but growing
evidence" of a genetic link to criminal and aggressive behavior); see also J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
The Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 865, 875-78 (1994) (exploring the attempts to link violent behavior to genetic makeup).
115. Last year, Rutgers University students attracted national attention during a protest over remarks made by the University's president, Francis Lawrence, that Black students
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orientation116 and so on-seems to be growing at an alarming pace and not
always with the best of intentions.U 7
One area in which tremendous reliance is placed on genetic makeup is
in the area of intelligence, as exemplified by Herrnstein's and Murray's
study. Scientists continually debate the question whether genes are the
sole determinant of intelligence, or whether they play only a limited role in
conjunction with environmental influences. Prominent IQ theorists suggested as early as the 1920s that emotions were an important component of
intelligence, but the idea of social intelligence never gained much credibility among scientists and psychologists in the earlier studies of intelligence.U8 Until recently, a person's intellectual abilities have been assessed
as a measure of the person's math and language skills, without regard to
any other kinds of talents the person possesses. In the early 1980s, a
Harvard University psychologist, Howard Gardner, introduced the concept
of "multiple intelligences." 119 As explained by Goleman, Gardner's initial
studies identified five types of intelligence in addition to "the two standard
academic kinds, verbal and mathematical-logical alacrity." 120 They included spatial capacity, kinesthetic genius, musical gifts, interpersonal
skills, and "intrapsychic" capacity. 121 As he continued to study multiple
intelligences, Gardner's lists stretched to twenty, but, as Goleman explains,
Gardner concluded that "there is no magic number to the multiplicity of
human talents." 122
The concept of emotional intelligence builds on the idea of multiple
intelligences and is distinct from intellectual intelligence, although no clear
definition exists. Yale psychologists Peter Salovey and Robert Sternberg
lacked the "genetic, hereditary background to have a higher [SAT score] average" than 750.
Doreen Carvajal, Head of Rutgers Apologizes Again, N.Y. TrMEs, Feb. 9, 1995, at A1; see
also Gary Younge, The Gene Genies, THE GuARDIAN, May 1, 1996, at T2 (profiling -scientists trying to prove a link between race and genetic superiority including Roger Pearson,
who has produced a vision of a "genetically-engineered master race," and Christopher
Brand, who is currently seeking publication for his book, THE G FACTOR, GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AND ITs IMPLICATIONs); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 209 (1995) (arguing that the value of the genetic tie varies in a way that promotes
racist and patriarchal norms); Rachel E. Frshman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Creatures
Deserve Constitutional Protection, 15 AM. J. L. & MEo. 461, 468-69 (1989) (expressing concern that granting patents for genetic research may lead to the abuse of genetic selectivity).
116. Sharon E. Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and
Sexual Orientation, 13 HARv. BLACKLETIER L.J. _ (1997) (forthcoming).
117. Natalie Angier, Study of Sex Orientation Doesn't Neatly Fit Mold, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 1993, at 24 ("In the sharp debate over the significance of recent work suggesting
biological basis for sexual orientation, all sides are struggling to reconcile the new findings
with their political ain1s and personal convictions.").
118. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 42.
119. Id. at 38.
120. ld.
121. Id. ("[T]he intrapsychic capacity could emerge. . .in the brilliant insights of
Sigmund Freud, or, with less fanfare, in the inner contentment that arises from attuning
one's life to be in keeping with one's true feelings.").
122. ld.
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have studied Gardner's ideas of multiple intelligences, focusing primarily
on how a person's intelligences work together to help the person live a
happy and productive life. Salovey and John Mayer, a psychologist at the
University of New Hampshire,l 23 introduced the concept of emotional intelligence and identified five types of abilities or skills it comprises. These
include knowing one's emotions, managing emotions, recognizing emotions
in others, handling relationships, and self-motivation. 124
In turn, Goleman describes emotional intelligence as a set of "abilities
such as being able to motivate oneself and persist in the face of frustrations;
to control impulse and delay gratification; to regulate one's moods and
keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize, and to
hope. " 125 Goleman asserts that traditional measures of intellectual intelligence, such as those studied in Herrstein's and Murray's The Bell Curve,
account for only about 20 percent of the factors which predict how successful a person will be in life. 126 Measures such as IQ have such relatively low
predictive value because they fail to take into consideration factors such as
a person's ability to control emotions, handle frustrations, and get along
with other people. 127 Emotional intelligence factors, which Goleman likens to a person's character, may have a much greater impact on a person's
ultimate success in life. 128
Goleman readily concedes that intelligence is a combination of both
genetics and environmental factors. 129 He strongly believes that emotional
intelligence skills can be learned. 130 Psychologists already teach emotional
intelligence to treat problems such as aggression or depression, but
Goleman suggests emotional intelligence offers a "set of skills and understandings essential for every child." 131 Some schools have special classes,
called 'social development,' 'life skills,' or 'social and emotional understanding,' to teach children how to develop emotional intelligence skills. 132
123. Id. at 47.
124. Id. at 43.
125. Id. at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 35.
128. Id. at 36 ("[P]eople who are emotionally adept- who know and manage their own
feelings well, and who read and deal effectively with other people's feelings - are at an
advantage in any domain of life, whether romance and intimate relationships or picking up
the unspoken rules that govern success in organizational politics.").
129. Id. at 34.
130. Id. at 261-300.
131. Id. The concept called "character education" has caught on recently and is being
taught in some schools. See Carol Innerst, College Official Champions Character-Education
Cause, Manifesto Outlines Principles for Parents, Teachers, WASH. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A.
Character education "is about developing virtues - good habits and dispositions which lead
students to responsible and mature adulthood." Id. Even President Clinton challenged "all
schools to teach 'good values and good citizenship."' Id.
132. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 261-62.
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In these classes, children learn to express their emotions, work well with
others, and react appropriately when faced with contention. 133
Goleman also points out that even a narrow focus on the question
whether genes or environmental influences are more important in measuring intellectual intelligence misses a crucial point. He suggests that a focus
on how the two measurements of intelligence can work together to enhance an individual's intellectual intelligence still may not reveal much
about an individual's likelihood of success. For example, high intellectual
intelligence may enable a person to secure a job, but Goleman asserts that
high emotional intelligence may be necessary for a person to get promoted
on the job. 134 Someone with high intellectual intelligence may become an
expert in English literature, for example, but the novelist herself will also
have high emotional intelligence. 135 Gardner's observation that intelligence is more complex than traditional aptitude tests acknowledge is
merely a starting point for understanding emotional intelligence and its significance in achieving success.
The notion of multiple intelligences, and especially the notion of emotional intelligence, alters traditional perceptions of intelligence, which, in
turn, reduces the need to rely on standard measurements of intellectual
intelligence in policy decision-making. Understanding the importance of
these skills and how they are developed offers insights on how we might
reconceive the education of our children and improve human relationships,
especially across racial boundaries.

B.

Integration and Emotional Intelligence

As Professor Michael McConnell states, "Segregation is part and parcel of a system of inequality."136 High emotional intelligence skills learned
while participating in integrated education can lead to solving the larger
problems of racial inequality. As commonly understood, integration in the
school desegregation context means allowing Black students to attend
White schools. 137 As McLaurin and Brown read together show, however,
the Supreme Court meant for integration to mean more than Blacks having
a physical presence in White schools. 138 Otherwise, the McLaurin Court
would not have held unconstitutional the intra-school segregation policy
that required Mr. McLaurin to be separated from his White classmates in
133. Id. at 261-76.
134. Id. at 35.
135. Id.
136. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1139. I agree with this observation, but would add
that voluntary segregation by people of color poses less of a threat to racial equality.
137. Because this understanding does not specifically address equality concerns once
the Black students are admitted to the school, some African-Americans have rejected the
idea that integration is a worthwhile goal. See Johnson, supra note 16.
138. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the same institution. 139 Further, it bears repeating that integration also
does not mean that Blacks should assimilate into White culture. This understanding of integration is unacceptable because it reinforces White
supremacy by making Blacks and people of other colors conform to the
normative standard of White. Rather, integration entails achieving racial
equality where Blacks, people of other colors, and Whites share equal
power in all aspects of American life-including meaningful participation
in designing and implementing governing laws and policies. In this way,
integration and racial equality are synonymous. If we are to achieve racial
equality, it is necessary for people of all races to begin to value each other's
differences and learn to relate to each other with equal respect.
A racially integrated environment is optimal for learning emotional
intelligence skills as they apply to race relations. Even if emotional intelligence is taught in a segregated environment, an individual only learns emotional intelligence in limited relationships. Moreover, even if emotional
intelligence skills in the context of race relations were taught in involuntarily racially segregated schools, it would be difficult to overcome the symbolic messages such segregation represents. Recall that involuntarily
segregating Black children and children of other colors from White children stigmatizes the children of color as "inferior" to their White classmates. Simultaneously, involuntary segregation reinforces feelings of
privilege in the White students. Moreover, unless students of different colors are able to interact with each other, any lessons about racial equality
and race relations remain mere abstractions to them. Each group of children sees the other group as "other"-not someone who is a part of the
child's real world~ Accordingly, it is easier to dismiss the importance of the
"other" and also to dismiss the importance of getting along and respecting
the "other." Thus, if the goal is to achieve racial equality and to use emotional intelligence skills to help achieve that goal, involuntarily segregated
schools hinder progress toward the goal. However, teaching emotional in.telligence skills in an integrated environment, especially in an environment
that is truly integrated beyond merely the physical presence and assimilation, takes emotional intelligence one step further.
C.

Emotional Intelligence and Race Relations

"A report from the National Center for Clinical Infant Programs
makes the point that school success is not predicted by a child's
fund of facts or a precocious ability to read so much as by emotional and social measures ... " 140
139. I explore this in more detail in my article, Beyond Admissions: Racial Equality in
Law Schools, 49 U. FLA. L. REv. _ (1997) (forthcoming).
140. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at .193.
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Teaching our children high emotional skills in truly integrated environments can help us solve larger problems in race relations. In the context of
race relationships then, I want to focus on three specific areas where emotional intelligence can foster better race relations: learning about racism,
managing racial anger, and developing empathy and altruism.
1.

Learning About Racism

"Know thyself'' is an honored adage, resounding with words of wisdom. Yet it is a proverb that is not always easy to follow. Often individuals
are not aware of their feelings and thus do not fully know and understand
why they react to certain situations the way they do. "Any emotion can
be-and often is-unconscious," Goleman asserts. 141 Moreover, many decisions that a person makes are emotional and extend beyond the realm of
rationality. For example, the choice of a marriage partner generally is
guided by more than reason. 142 As we steer our ways through the decisions
that confront us, being aware of how we felt about similar past experiences
enables us to become more attuned to what we are feeling now. The more
adept we are at understanding our own emotions, the more likely we are to
manage and control the responses to them.
The message about the importance of knowing oneself is not new.
However, given that many of ou:r: emotions operate on us unconsciously, it
is surprising how little consideration is given to the possibility that unconscious emotions also influence policy decision makers. It may be "only
human," for example, to believe that an individual can be objective about a
decision regardless of his or her view on a particular matter. Had the late
Justice Marshall been on the Bench that decided Brown, would his decision
to join the unanimous opinion have raised questions about his objectivity?
Conversely, can there be any doubt that his experiences as a Black man
influenced his opinion about the unconstitutionality of the separate but
equal doctrine? 143
Because we often are not fully aware of what motivates us to react in
various ways to different situations, we should be particularly concerned
about the impact our decisions might have on others. For example, Professors Paul Brest144 and, more recently, Charles Lawrence145 have explored
and described in the literature the phenomenon of "unconscious racism."
Professor Lawrence suggests that often a White person harbors fears or
negative thoughts about people of color, especially Blacks, without even
141. Id. at 54.
142. !d. at 53.
143. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 173-81.
144. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1976) (exploring how unfairness can result from government's "unconscious
failure" to treat people of color as it would treat Whites).
145. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
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being aware of it. 146 A declaration by a White person that, "Some of my
best friends are Black," is an expression of unconscious racism. The underlying presumption of this common sentiment is that the speaker would normally not befriend a Black person, but nevertheless has created some
exceptions. The exceptions then allow the speaker to deny that he or she is
racist, because, after all, how can a person be racist if he or she has friends
of a different color?
Just the other day, one of my daughter's teachers, a very dear elderly
White woman, confided in me that she did not even notice that my daughter is Black. A White person who does not see another person's color fails
to understand how her denial of the person's race is a denial of the person
in significant and important ways. 147 Imagine how a child of color feels
when her teacher, someone she admires, does not value the child's race.
How does the child of color develop a positive self-image and strong selfesteem if adults devalue her race? Moreover, because the teacher openly
devalues my daughter's racial identity, the other children in the class also
learn to devalue racial differences. In this way, the White children's privileged status gets reinforced.
Unconscious racism perhaps can be seen as a failure to be attuned to
our negative feelings about race. It reflects a belief that being colorless is
better than being colorful. Consistent with the message of Professor Lawrence and others, becoming attuned to one's own feelings is a constant
challenge and we must learn to be sensitive to color differences among people to minimize actively the unintended consequences of our behavior.
The impact of unconscious racism surfaces in most post-Brown decisions focusing on race and education. For example, it may be difficult for
many people, especially White people, to believe that members of the
Court would be intentionally racist in their opinions, except perhaps in
Plessy. At the same time, it is also hard to believe that some members of
the Court do not realize that their votes in particular cases promote White
hegemony. Yet all of the post-Brown cases explored in this article are infected with racism. This is obvious in cases like Rodriguez and Martinez,
where the Court upheld state laws and policies that placed undue burdens
on some minority children's abilities to receive a quality public education.
It is equally obvious in Bakke, which sanctioned the concept of reverse
146. !d. at 332.
147. HARLAN L. DALTON, RAciAL HEALING (1995); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1991) ("Suppressing the recognition
of a racial classification in order to act as if a person were not of some cognizable racial class
is inherently racially premised."). On the other hand, it is not always possible to tell a
person's race by their color. Dean Gregory Howard Williams tells a moving account of his
experiences as a young Black boy who thought he was White for the first nine years of his
life. GREGORY HowARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE CoLOR LINE (1995). Similarly, Professor Judy Scales-Trent describes herself as a "white Black." JuDY ScALES-TRENT, NoTES OF
A WHITE BLAcK WoMAN: RAcE, CoLoR, CoMMUNITY (1995). These stories, as well as
others, reinforce the notion that race is socially constructed.
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discrimination and started the unraveling of affirmative action. 148 Similarly, although the plaintiffs in Kadrmas were not of color, they were poor.
"Poverty itself delivers emotional blows to children." 149 Moreover, any
government policy that falls disproportionately on poor people also runs
the risk of hurting people of color more than other groups due to the
higher level of poverty for people of color. 150
Even Plyler and Fordice, which held for the plaintiffs, have similar negative racial overtones to them. Recall that Plyler, a 5-4 decision, is at risk
of being overruled, especially given growing anti-immigrant sentiment151
and simultaneous renewed judicial embracing of federalism under the
Rehnquist Court. 152 Most telling, perhaps, was the Plyler Court's failure
(like in Rodriguez and Martinez) even to discuss the propriety of applying
strict scrutiny to the legislative scheme that excluded minority children,
thus implying that race and ethnicity were totally irrelevant to the analysis.
The negative racial implications of Fordice also reflect powerful statements about our commitment to racial and educational equality. Between
1963 when the Mississippi Board of Trustees adopted the "ACT-only" automatic admissions requirement and 1985 when the plaintiffs' suit was initiated, the disparity in scores between Whites and Blacks on the exam
remained virtually the same. This is one reason the colleges remained segregated twenty years later. Nevertheless, the Court makes it clear that
"[w]e do not suggest that absent a discriminatory purpose different
148. Sharon E. Rush, Understanding Affirmative Action: One Feminist's Perspective, in
AN ETHICAL EDUCATION: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN THE MULTICULTURAL UNIVERSITY 195 (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 1994).
149. "[P]oorer children at age five are already more fearful, anxious, and sad than their
better-off peers, and have more behavior problems such as frequent tantrums and destroying things, a trend that continues through the teen years." GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 256.
150. See generally ANDREW HAcKER, Two NATIONs: BLAcK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HosTILE, UNEQUAL 99-111 (1995) (noting that "46.3 percent of black children live below
the poverty line, compared with 12.3 percent of white youngsters").
151. "People should not expect to come to this country with their hands out and receive benefits paid by tax-paying Americans." Joanna Kakissis, Public Sentiment, Congressional Action Growing Hostile, STAR TRIB., Dec. 7, 1995, at 20A (quoting Representative
Bill Archer (Republican-Texas), Chairman, House Ways & Means Committee). See also
Celia W. Dugger, Immigration Bills' Dealing May Imperil Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 1996, at Bl (stating that anti-immigrant sentiment is a factor in congressional debate over
whether to require asylum seekers to apply for asylum within one month of arriving in the
United States or lose their right to apply for asylum); Robert Pear, U.S. Strengthening Patrols Along the Mexican Border, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1996, § 1, at 8 (discussing President
Clinton's recent signing of legislation allocating a one-half billion dollar increase to Immigration and Naturalization Service budget to enhance border enforcement and detention of
illegal aliens along Mexican border). See generally Bill Ong Ring, Beyond the Rhetoric of
Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in
an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 863 (1993) (critiquing both
sides of the immigration and cultural pluralism debate).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that congress's
commerce power does not extend to regulation of firearms within school zones); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress lacks authority to "commandeer" states into regulating radio-active waste disposal).
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programmatic ImSSlons accompanied by different admission standards
would be constitutionally suspect simply because one or more schools are
racially identifiable." 153 Once again, the Court renews its commitment to a
finding of "discriminatory purpose" in addition to "discriminatory effect"
to find a constitutional violation. Adoption of this standard would be less
disturbing if discriminatory intent could be deduced from discriminatory
knowledge. After all, how is it possible to rely knowingly on admittedly
biased data without intending the consequences of such reliance? But if
the Court meant "intent" to be proved by "knowledge," it would not have
needed to trace the continuing segregative effect of reliance on the ACT
exam to the prior de jure segregation. It is as if more recent policies, policies adopted well beyond the shameful days of de jure segregation, will be
virtually immune to constitutional attack because no one would believe
that a modem state would adopt an intentionally discriminatory policy,
and, even if a legislature adopted such a policy, no one could prove it.
Finally, Jenkins is particularly troubling because the Court so readily
let the federal judiciary and the state avoid addressing the continuing racial
segregation and the continuing failure of students in the KCMSD to
achieve at high levels. Significantly, the Court reached its conclusions by
ignoring factual findings at the lower court levels that demonstrated the
state's failure to meet the Freeman test of showing a "good faith effort to
get rid of segregation to the extent practicable." Specifically, the dissent
questioned whether, in fact, the state had even acted in good faith. 154 The
Court of Appeals found that the "'State has never offered the Court a viable, even tenable, alternative [to the District Court's magnet school plan]
and has been extremely antagonistic in its approach to effecting the desegregation of the KCMSD' (emphasis in original)." 155 The dissent also cited
the Court of Appeals finding that the "'evidence on the record fell far
short of establishing that such vestiges had been eliminated to the extent
practicable.' "156
The problem of racial discrimination cannot be solved by absolving
responsible parties from their obligations to try to end it. The state has an
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the KCMSD Black
children's right to receive a quality public education as decided in Brown.
The federal judiciary has an obligation to see that Missouri fulfills its duty
"with all deliberate speed." 157 Money alone could not buy Missouri out of
its disgraceful past. On the other hand, the amount spent on Black children's education is not inconsequential and other remedies should be tried
in an effort to comply with Brown. At the very least, we must ask why the
Court so willingly gave up on the goals of ending racial discrimination and
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Fordice, 505 U.S. at 736.
Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2080 (Souter, J., dissenting).
ld.
ld.
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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providing equal educational opportunities to all children. As Justice Ginsburg said in her dissent in Jenkins: "Given the deep, inglorious history of
segregation in Missouri, to curtail desegregation at this time and in this
manner is an action at once too swift and too soon. " 158
The holding in Jenkins should cause concern because we now know for
certain we cannot satisfy the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection guarantee by providing only equal educational facilities
for Black and White students. Gone is any sense of security that may have
existed in knowing the fiction in Brown could be exposed, perhaps as a
desperate plea for expending more resources on Black schools. We now
know for certain what we suspected all along-that separate can never be
equal in the faulty-premise sense of Brown, which built on the faulty-premise sense of procedural equality in Plessy.
The atmosphere surrounding involuntary de facto segregation is reminiscent of the de jure segregation prior to Brown and makes one wonder if
Jenkins makes the problem of involuntarily segregated public· schools
worse with respect to Black children's right to receive a quality education.159 Black children still suffer the consequences of attending involuntarily racially segregated schools, along with the societal discrimination
against Blacks that accompanies the separate but equal doctrine, but no
longer have hope that Brown will rescue them.
Furthermore, since Brown, White children continue to be deprived of
learning about Black culture and history, and, significantly, their sense of
superiority to Blacks is reinforced as a matter of acceptable, modem social
practice independent of the now socially unacceptable Jim Crow laws. Finally, Jenkins teaches our children that walking away from the problem of
segregated schools is a legitimate way of dealing with it, even at the expense of their ultimate welfare.
In short, a close examination of the post-Brown cases provides some
evidence of the racism--conscious or unconscious-that seems to be guiding education cases. Even if state policy makers and the Court could not
see the profound racist implications of their decisions on a case-by-case
basis, they should be able to see the aggregative effect of their decisions
over time. We now know that our commitment to children's education and
racial equality is waning, not just in cases like Rodriguez, Plyler, Martinez ,
Kadrmas, and Bakke, but even in the classic desegregation context itself.
158. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
159. Moreover, although the sting of these cases is tempered somewhat by the decision
in U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992), the finding of racial aninllls in Fordice is not likely to
be found in future cases focusing on race discrimination, as the redistricting cases show. See
infra note 262 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the Court did find Colorado's
Amendment Two, which prohibited laws that protected gays and lesbians from discrimination, unconstitutional because the amendment was motivated by "aninllls." Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
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The Jenkins Court condoned a "separate but unequal" philosophy with respect to children's, especially Black children's, right to receive a free, quality public education. In other words, we now know just how shallow our
commitment is to Brown, to children's education, and to racial equality.
Given what we now know, it is time to revive Brown's principles of
racial equality and educational equality. It is important to learn about racism and how to avoid unintended and unproductive consequences of decisions that promote the racial divide. Consistent with high emotional
intelligence, we can recommit to racial equality by providing all of our children with a quality education in fully integrated schools. In tum, the children will learn to develop their own emotional intelligence skills in the area
of race relations.
2.

Managing Racial Anger

Some people are mad that their tax money helps support immigrants.160 Others are upset that some people in our country cannot speak
English. 161 The acquittal of O.J. Simpson angered most White people. 162
The anger generated primarily among Blacks by the acquittal of the officers in the Rodney King trial fueled the fire that burned down parts of
Los Angeles. Louis Farrakhan's rhetoric is infused with racial anger and
hatred. 163 The Aryan Nation is growing and is committed to promoting
160. Louis Uchitelle and N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of
Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at § 1, at 1; see also GOP Aims at Legal Immigrants,
TAMPA TruB., Nov. 22, 1994, Nation/World, at 1 (quoting Robert Rector of the conservative
Heritage Foundation: "There's a growing recognition that the federal welfare system cannot serve as a deluxe retirement system for elderly people from the Third World.").
161. For example, a Texas judge recently ordered a mother to stop speaking Spanish to
her 5-year old daughter or face losing custody. Sam Howe Verhovek, Mother Scolded by
Judge for Speaking in Spanish, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A12. The judge told the
mother that speaking to her child in Spanish only was a form of child abuse which would
relegate the child to a future as a housemaid. Patrick Rogers & Karen Roebuck, Tongue
Lashing: A Texas Judge's English-Only Order Ignites a Bilingual War of Words, PEOPLE,
Sept. 25, 1995, at 111. The judge later rescinded his order under pressure from political
leaders. Ironically, the judge publicly apologized to housemaids before any apology was
made to Mexican-Americans or other Spanish-speaking Americans. !d.
162. Polls Reveal Racial Divide on Verdict, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (MEMPHIS), Oct. 5,
1995, at 8A (according to a CBS News poll, taken by phone following the O.J. Simpson
verdict, 87% of blacks said the verdict was right while 59% of whites said the verdict was
wrong (results have a 4% margin of error)); Mark Whitaker, Decision . . .And Division,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 24 (reporting that "much of white America felt a surge of
outrage" at Simpson's acquittal). Said one angry American, "White suburbia is real disgusted with O.J. Simpson and disgusted with the whole black culture. It bums us up that all
these black people are thrilled that he got off." Edwin Chen, Million Man March, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A1 (quoting Jean Easley).
163. In 1984, Farrakhan referred to Judaism as a "gutter religion," and described Nazi
leader Adolph Hitler as a "wickedly great" man. I'm No Hitler, Farrakhan Tells Television
Host, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, § 1, at 23. Ten years later, Farrakahn's senior aide, Khalid
Abdul Muhanimad, stirred national controversy over remarks made during a speech in
which Muhanimad "called Jews the 'blood-suckers' of the black community, labeled the
Pope as a 'no-good cracker,' and urged black South Africans to kill all whites." Farrakhan
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White supremacy at all costs.164 These are just a few examples of how racially divided we are as a nation and how angry we are at perceived racial
injustices.
Probably very few, if any, people enjoy feeling out of emotional control. "Mood management," as Goleman calls it, is a full-time job. 165 I focus on anger here because I believe this emotion is at the core of racial
divisiveness and impedes efforts to achieve racial equality. Almost any article or book about race written by a person of color, especially an AfricanAmerican, will discuss racial anger. 166 In response, other authors are expressing their anger at such things as perceived "racial preferences. " 167
Moreover, "[o]f all the moods that people want to escape, rage seems to be
the most intransigent."168 It is "passion's slave." 169
Neurological responses account for the buildup of anger, but even
neurological reactions are in response to some kind of environmental trigger. Generally, anger is sparked by a sense of endangerment, which can be
a physical threat or a symbolic threat to an individual's self-esteem or dignityP0 Once triggered, the concomitant neurological responses make anger one of the most volatile emotions. Many believe that venting anger
dissipates it, but actually the opposite is true: anger builds on anger. Accordingly, Goleman asserts that the way to "manage" anger is to shortcircuit it before it begins.
This is a simplistic presentation of a complex phenomenon, but it nevertheless provides a foundation for discussing Black and White anger. Key
to this discussion is recognizing that assaults to a person's self-esteem or
dignity can be met with anger. Repeated assaults escalate the person's anger, regardless of any venting the person may do.
later demoted Muhammad and publicly rebuked his statements as "mean-spirited." Farrakhan did not, however, publicly rebuke the message of his aide's speech. Steven Holmes,
Farrakhan Repudiates Speech for Tone, Not Anti-Semitism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al.
164. "If [Aryan Nation leader] Richard Butler had his way, the northwestern corner of
the United States would be a white-only homeland, blacks would be sent to Africa and Jews
would be stripped of their property, expatriated, or killed." John P. Martin, Aryan Nation 's
Butler Decries 'Enemies', MoRNING CALL (ALLENTOWN), Feb. 4, 1996, at A15. Butler
heads a Christian Identity sect of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian which has an estimated membership of 30,000 to 200,000 nationwide. Id.
165. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 57.
166. Representative examples include ScALES-TRENT, supra note 147; WILLIAMS,
supra note 147; JoE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLAcK
MIDDLE-CLASS ExPERIENCE (1994) (reporting on and analyzing the results of interviews
and discussions of racism with more than 200 Black professionals); Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 665, 679 (1995); and Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda , 80 Cal. L. Rev.
673, 728 (1992).
167. DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY (1995).
168. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 59.
169. Id. at 56.
170. Id. at 60.

1997]

EDUCATION & RACE

33

The buildup of anger in African-Americans is a phenomenon that has
been memorialized by novelists 171 and studied as a mental condition by
psychiatrists.172 More recently, bell hooks has written a book about it, suggesting that Black rage can be a source of positive energy in the struggle
against racism. 173 Black anger started with the historical enslavement of
African-Americans and it festers because African-Americans continue to
suffer racial oppression. "[B]lack rage results from a simmering resentment built up over a long period of time." 174
The anger generated by the racial divisiveness is also apparent among
Whites, although the source of White anger is significantly different from ·
the source of Black anger. Specifically, Whites enjoy a privileged status in
our society because of their color. Professor Cheryl Harris brilliantly describes how Whiteness is equivalent to a property interest. 175 Just as the
Black child learns that he or she is "inferior" to Whites, the White child
learns that he or she is "superior" to Blacks. These related messages are
conveyed and taught to children consciously and unconsciously. Correspondingly, Whites like Allan Bakke eventually learn to expect they should
not be denied the right to enjoy their "superior" status because of their
race. The colorblindness philosophy implicit in cases like Bakke operates
to preserve the privileged status of Whiteness and affirms a racial hierarchy
in which white is valued over black. When Whites perceive that they have
been unjustly excluded from programs or from jobs because "preference"
is given to someone who is not White, their dignity also has been assaulted
and the result is anger.
Black anger, then, results from being historically and systematically
denied privilege, while White anger results from the perceived threat of
losing historical and system-wide privilege. The distinction is critical, but it
is also critical to pay attention to the fact that almost everyone is angry
about race. Consequently, it is important to think about how to manage
racial anger.
Venting anger in thoughtless ways in response to highly emotional
events, such as the Rodney King trial verdict or the O.J. Simpson trial verdict, fails to deal with the underlying causes for the anger. Similarly, providing temporary remedies to racial problems-supporting affirmative
action policies and then backing away from them depending on the political climate-will not repair the damage or break the cycle of anger generated by poor race relations. It may actually exacerbate the problem.
Goleman suggests that angry feelings themselves must be managed before
171. See, e.g. ,

ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PuRPLE

(1982);

RicHARD WRIGHT, NA-

TivE SON (1940).

172. See Judd F. Sneirson, Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to
a Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2251, 2255-58 (1995).
173. bell hooks, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM (1995).
174. Sneirson, supra note 172, at 2282 (footnote omitted).
175. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709 (1993).
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they have a chance to "hijack" us. 176 Once the emotional hijacking occurs,
we become more susceptible to the initial triggers as we sense the threats
and familiar anger that go along with them.
On the subject of affirmative integration policies, it seems that many
people's emotions have been hijacked. In my opinion, the hijacking began
with the decision in Bakke, which sparked a fight between Whites and
Blacks and people of other colors. In striking down the U.C. Davis Medical School admissions policy that actively sought to integrate the school,
the Court held it would be unfair to hold Allan Bakke, an innocent victim,
responsible for solving the School's problem of racial segregation. The
Court was ·concerned with augmenting the racial divide between Blacks
and Whites by upholding a policy that made White people angry. 177
Noticeably absent from the Court's decision is any recognition of how
angry people of color are at being systematically excluded from participating in state programs. From the Court's perspective, it is as if anger were a
relevant factor only if the policy were upheld. The simmering anger that
Blacks and people of other colors feel at constantly being discriminated
against on the basis of their race was seemingly entirely invisible or irrelevant to the Court. The risk of making White people angrier at the encroachment of people of color in the practice of medicine was too great for
the Court. Its decision, therefore, placed the burden of controlling racial
anger on people of color.
Significantly, the Court's decision also suggests that even people of
color should reject affirmative integration policies because of the stigma
that is associated with them. For example, prominent Black scholars like
Professor Stephen Carter of the Yale Law School adhere to the position
that affirmative integration policies are degrading to Blacks because of the
stigma attached to them. 178 Justice Thomas votes to strike down affirmative integration policies. Many of his opinions reflect an angry tone at the
suggestion that Blacks are incapable of succeeding without such policies.
His most recent opinion in Adarand exemplifies this:
So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because of
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot
compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority, or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they
have been wronged by the government's use of race...

176. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 13-14.
177. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
178. STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF
(1991).

AN AFFIRMATIVE AcriON BABY

47-69
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In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination
based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. 179
State sponsored stigmatization of someone as racially "inferior" is a
serious matter in a society that is committed to democracy and equal protection-so serious, in fact, that the Brown Court overruled Plessy primarily because of the stigmatic harm the separate but equal doctrine did to
Blacks in requiring public school segregation. 180 Yet there is something
troubling about this point when it is applied in the integration context
where the State attempts to help Blacks obtain jobs or get admitted into
educational programs. How is it possible to equate discrimination in the
integration context with discrimination in an involuntary segregation context? To view them as equally "noxious" is troubling because it suggests
that all forms of discrimination are unpalatable and at odds with the fundamental nature of law. In reality, however, all laws discriminate and draw
distinctions between and among people. The real question is whether the
government can justify the distinctions its laws make. 181 Given the
profound history of racial discrimination against Blacks, to discriminate in
their favor seems justifiable.
Basing decisions on the constitutionality of policies that actively function to integrate government institutions by focusing on the "inferiority"
point is troubling for another reason as well.182 Rejecting affirmative integration policies because they stigmatize people of color may seem to be
"racially neutral" or even supportive of people of color. Unfortunately,
people of color are stigmatized even without affirmative integration policies. Specifically, the absence of Blacks and people of other colors from
state jobs and programs is also stigmatizing because it implies that people
of color are not qualified to be in those jobs or programs. 183 A focus on
179. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
180. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
181. A lesson from Erwin Chemerinsky.
182. I am particularly grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky for sharing his thoughts with me
on this issue and helping me understand how to deal with the affirmative action debate in
the context of my own life. As a white woman who has been identified publicly as an "affirmative action hire" at my institution (along with the few other women at the time), I have
had to deal personally with the meaning of this reality. Undoubtedly, the "public accusation" was intended as a "put-down;" as a message that I (and my women colleagues) were
hired only because we are women and that we were not the most qualified applicants for the
job (who, by implication, were men). Given the dearth of women on the faculty when I was
hired, it is unlikely that I (and my female colleagues) would have been hired without an
affirmative decision on the part of the faculty to hire women. As Prof. Chemerinsky
pointed out to me, however, it is also true that if the faculty had not made that affirmative
decision to hire women, all women would have been stigmatized because of the resounding
message that no women are qualified to be on a law school faculty. In this way, the stigma
argument is a no-win situation for minorities.
183. A lesson from Erwin Chemerinsky.
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only part of the stigma problem that denounces affirmative integration policies, which are partially based on the recognition that admissions criteria
like standardized exams are racially biased, still excludes Blacks and people
of other colors.
Thus, the affirmative action debate rages on as if it has nothing to do
with promoting the values of integration and racial equality. Moreover, the
anger it causes is fueled by national leaders like California's Governor Pete
Wilson who appeal to White voters by promising not to favor people of
color over them, or stated alternatively, by adhering to current policies that
favor them over people of color. 184 Petition drives are going on in some
parts of the country to outlaw affirmative integration programs because
many Whites, some Blacks, and some people of other colors are angry at
the perceived unfairness in them. 185 Affirmative action has become a focal
point for some Whites to speak out against racial equality, even though
they may not understand this is the unintended consequence of their antiaffirmative action stance. Sadly, affirmative action has turned into our nation's racial scapegoat; it is being used explicitly to divide people along race
lines.
We can stop this. First, consistent with high emotional intelligence, we
can listen to each other and acknowledge our own and other people's anger. Only then can "cognitive reframing" begin, which is necessary to escape the emotional hijacking we are facing on the issue of racial equality
and, in particular, affirmative action. 186 Under this view, the burden thus
falls on individuals to become attuned to their own angry feelings about
race and develop skills for expressing concerns in ways that are not accusatory or self-righteous. 187 Second, we can strive to understand the important role affirmative action plays in promoting racial equality. As
explained above, unless we value integration and learn to respect people of
different races, racial equality will remain elusive. Finally, we can begin to
heal the racial division by focusing on developing our empathic and altruistic skills.

184. Trevor W. Coleman, A Backlash Cancels Gains in Civil Rights, HARTFORD CouJuly 4, 1995, at A9.
185. See B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Fighting Affirmative Action, He Finds His Race an
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at A1 (reporting that forces fighting affirmative action
collected 693,230 petition signatures in California to put the issue to a statewide vote on the
fall ballot).
As this article was in its final editing stages, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
Proposition 209, an amendment to California's Constitution that prohibits the use of racebased and gender-based affirmative action programs in public employment, public education, or public contracting. The Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6512 (9th Cir. April 8, 1997).
186. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 74.
187. !d.
RANT,
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Developing Empathy and Altruism

"Empathy" is "the ability to know how another feels." 188 "Altruism"
is the ability to act on one's empathic feelings toward another. 189 The feelings are related in that the stronger an individual's empathetic response to
another person's suffering, the more likely that the individual will help the
victim.
Many scholars, especially feminist scholars, have explored already the
role of empathy in legal decision-making. 190 Empathy is particularly relevant to race relations, for we need to foster greater interracial understanding. The different races, and particularly White people, need to understand
on a much deeper level what it must be like to be a different color. Such
understanding is difficult in the midst of current rhetoric that color is irrelevant. This rhetoric perpetuates a color caste system in which white is the
most valued color. Accordingly, we (especially Whites) must strive both to
understand that color matters and to do something about the disparity in
the way people of color are devalued compared to the way White people
are valued. This moves us beyond empathy and into action.
In many ways, our legal system does not expect people to be altruistic.
The "no duty to rescue" rule protects people who do not want to help victims. On the other hand, as . Goleman notes, even John Stuart Mill wrote
that our natural feelings of empathy and our ability to protect ourselves
from the hurt that comes from the wounding of others is the "guardian of
justice." 191 Seeing the connections among empathy, altruism, and justice is
indicative of high emotional intelligence. But is this too much to ask in a
society where individual sacrifice becomes necessary to achieve racial and
educational equality?
188. Id. at 96.
189. Id. at 105.
190. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1574 (1987);
Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism: Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 930 (1995).
191. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 105; see also John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, reprinted in THE PmLOSOPHY OF JoHN STUART MILL 328 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961). On
what is "just," Mill wrote that
[i]t is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether
good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust, that he should obtain a good, or be
made to undergo an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest
and most empathetic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general

mind.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JoHN STUART MILL, supra, at 374. On empathy, Mill observed,
a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part such that any conduct which
threatens the security of the society generally is threatening to his own, and calls
forth his instinct (if instinct it be) of self-defiance.
Id. at 382.
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Several years ago, my home institution conducted a national search for
a university president. 192 The university is located in a sleepy southern
town and, not surprisingly, had few women and people of color on the
faculty or in top administrative positions. As a state university, it was committed to equality and had an affirmative action policy in an attempt to
increase the representation of women and people of color as professors and
administrators. The presidential search came down to two candidates-a
White man and a Black woman. All the news media surrounding the president's selection presented both finalists as "equally qualified." For a few
days there was suspense in the community speculated about which candidate would get the job. Some wondered if the Board of Regents would
really be able to hire a Black woman as president. As it turned out, of
course, they did not break with tradition and the White man was hired.
I have often wondered what would have happened if the White man
who was in final contention for the job decided he did not want the presidency-after the record of the Black woman being "equally qualified" was
made public. Suppose he had decided it was important for the university to
hire the Black woman, who presumably would be hired if he were no
longer interested in the position. Dropping out of contention could have
been consistent with his commitment to racial equality. Even if the university re-opened the search after he dropped out, he nevertheless could have
left the community-the entire educational community-with a profound
message about the value of racial equality and educational equality.
Admittedly, for the presidential candidate to forsake a job that he may
have wanted is asking a lot, perhaps too much. Maybe it was too much to
expect Allan Bakke to accept his rejection from over ten medical schools
two years in a row without suing for one of those 16 spots at the U.C. Davis
Medical School that were targeted for people of color. Perhaps i~ was asking too much of the McAllen, Texas, community to let eight-year-old Roberto live with his sister and go to the public schools there. It also may be
too much to ask communities to adopt taxing schemes that will help subsidize bus rides so that poor kids can get to the schools. Maybe it was asking
too much for families to stay in the Kansas City, Missouri, school district
and fight for racial equality and educational equality rather than fleeing to
the suburbs.
Each of these situations poses difficult dilemmas for the individuals
who are affected by them. Certainly, I do not mean to suggest how any one
individual, family, or community should respond in any particular situation.
It is relatively easy to discuss these things in the abstract, but it is quite
another matter when they affect us personally. These examples do raise,
however, the fundamental question of whether we are truly committed to
racial equality. If we could answer that question, then we would be clearer
192. I talk about this story in my article, Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Understanding Diversity, 42 U . FLA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 & n.25 (1990).
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about how we want to structure our laws and make decisions to achieve
that goal.
There was a time when we seemed more committed as a nation to
racial and educational equality than we seem to be at present. The passage
of the Civil Rights Act 193 and the holding in Brown illustrated our earlier
commitment. Admittedly, even then there was a lot of hostility directed at
government efforts to achieve racial equality. Nevertheless, the federal
government, many state and local governments, and many citizens held fast
to the underlying principles behind laws like the Civil Rights Act and
Brown. In contrast, current trends, especially at the nationallevel,194 are to
give in to racial inequality-to walk away from the KCMSD, to forget
about Roberto, Sarita and her siblings. Some states are even enacting laws
like Proposition 187 that are dramatically at odds with equality and democratic principles. 195
If sacrifices on behalf of racial equality are always too much to ask,
then we should be prepared for a return to involuntary de facto segregation. Alternatively, if we do not want an involuntarily segregated society,
we need to chart a new course. Employing high emotional intelligence
skills offers insights into how we might do this. Leaders with high intellectual and emotional skills are necessary if we want to renew our commitment to racial and educational equality.
III.
A

PLEA TO ADULTS FOR EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT

LEADERSHIP IN PURSUIT OF RACIAL EQUALIT Y A ND
RESPECfFUL INTERRACIAL RELATIONS

A.

Coaching Our Children to Develop Emotional Intelligence

To secure healthy friendships, children need to develop appropriate
social skills-skills that will also help them in their adult relationships.
Goleman explains that one essential skill we need to have healthy interpersonal relationships is to be able to make others feel good about themselves
without losing our integrity. 196 While this might seem obvious and even
simple, it is a learned behavior. For example, the child who wants to join a
group of toddlers already at play needs to know how to use her social skills
to get the group to welcome her. Studies show that the child who tries to
draw attention to herself and away from the group is likely to be rejected
by the group. The child who is able to patiently observe the playgroup and
193. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1964).
194. Some states expressly provide a constitutional right to a free public education for
every child. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
195. See supra. notes 59 and 60 and accompanying text.
196. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 119.
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assess how and when it is best to try to join in is a welcome addition. 197
Moreover, the socially attuned child usually engages in some kind of behavior that tells the other children she understands and accepts the group
and waits to have her acceptance confirmed before she actively participates
by voicing opinions. A child learns how to manage her interpersonal skills,
as described above, through modeling. 198 "[W]e unconsciously imitate the
emotions we see displayed by someone else, through an out-of-awareness
motor mimicry of their facial expression, gestures, tone of voice, and other
nonverbal markers of emotion." 199 This tendency places tremendous responsibility on adults to develop our own emotional intelligence so that we
can act as "emotional coaches" for our children.200
Teaching children to respect children of different races may be one of
the most important coaching jobs we do as adults. Modeling respect for
racial differences is important if we are to achieve racial equality. Significantly, the importance of non-verbal cues in creating racial strife is worth
examining. If how something is said is at least as important as what is said,
then adults need to pay closer attention to the silent racial messages they
give to children. For example, many important policy decision makers, as
well as some Supreme Court Justices, believe that society is colorblind.201
Consistent with this verbal message, many government policies are required to reflect that race is a facially neutral factor in decisionmaking.
Challenging this verbal message, however, is an overwhelming nonverbal message that race is far from irrelevant in our society and that, in
fact, it matters a lot. Consider placement of children in educational programs designed to meet their specific needs. Black children are two times
more likely than White children to be targeted for "special education" programs, but are rarely selected for "gifted" programs, which are predominantly comprised of White children.Z02 Although Brown and McLaurin
challenged the legitimacy of the separate but equal doctrine by attempting
to expose the real message that involuntary segregation stamps a badge of
inferiority on African-American children, we nevertheless continue to
stamp them with that badge by the way educational placements are made. ·
Moreover, the examples of the ways in which people of color are devalued
in our society and the concomitant ways in which White people are valued
are staggering. Today's verbal message that the races are "equal" and that
197. See id. a:t 123-24 (citing Thomas Hatch, Social Intelligence in Children, Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association (1990)).
198. Id. at 113.
199. Id. at 115.
200. Id. at 191.
201. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
202. Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 1237, 1251, 1256. Consider this in light of Hermstein's and Murray's suggestion that some remedial education programs be discontinued in favor of increased programs
for gifted students. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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we are a colorblind society defies the message we give to children by the
disparate ways we treat people of color and Whites.
Many of our children, particularly our children of color, are in trouble.
Many prominent children's advocates have written moving accounts of the
bleak lives of some of our children-Andrew Hacker,2°3 Jonathan Kozol,2°4
Robert Coles,205 Alex Kotlowitz, 206 Marian Wright Edelman207 , to list a
few. All children are increasingly becoming victims of poverty,2°8 violence,209 abuse, 210 delinquency,2 11 drugs,2 12 sexual promiscuity,213 teenage
pregnancy,214 depression,2 15 suicide,216 unemployment,2 17 and illiteracy. 218
Moreover, Goleman points out that "if the focus is on African-American
youth, especially in the inner city, (the situation] is utterly bleak-all the
203. See supra note 150.
204. See supra note 1.
205. Robert Coles has written a library of books on children, including a five volume
series entitled CHILDREN OF CRISIS. The CHILDREN OF CRISIS series includes the following
titles: CHILDREN oF Crusrs: A STUDY oF CoURAGE AND FEAR (1967); MIGRANTs, SHARE·
CROPPERS, MOUNTAINEERS (1971); THE SoUTH GOES NORTH (1971); ESKIMOS, CHICANOS,
INDIANS (1977); and PRIVILEGED ONES: THE WELL-OFF AND THE RICH IN AMERICA
(1977).
206. THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991).
207. GUIDE MY FEET (1995); THE MEASURE OF OUR SUCCESS (1993).
208. See Barbara Crossette, Toll of Childbearing, 585,000 Women Die Per Year, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1996, at A12 (reporting that of 18leading industrialized nations, "only [two
countries] have poorer children on average than the U.S." and that "half the children living
with a single mother in the U.S ... are living in poverty").
209. See Janet Allon, Gang Trials Start, But Drugs Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, at
13-16 (reporting the story of two teenagers' deaths due to gang violence).
210. See Tamar Lewin, Parents Poll Finds Child Abuse to Be More Common, N.Y .
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1995, at A17 ("One [study] estimated, based on parents' own reports, that
more than three million children are physically abused each year in the name of
discipline.").
211. See Wendy A Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism and Adult
Power in Juvenile Justice, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 495.
212. See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; End the War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at
A29 (discussing effects of drugs on children).
213. See Andrea Adelson, A Campaign in California Aims to Reduce Sex and
Pregnancies Among Teen-agers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at D5 (quoting Gov. Pete Wilson,
concerned about the cost of a "vicious cycle of promiscuity and irresponsibility").
214. See Mireya Navarro, Teen-age Mothers Viewed as Abused Prey of Older Men, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1996, § 1, at 1 (discussing the trend of trying to reduce teen pregnancy by
toughening statutory rape laws). A recent study found the total cost of teen pregnancy to be
nearly $7 billion. "[A]ll told, about 500,000 children a year are born to girls 15 to 19 ... ."
Steven A. Holmes, '96 Cost of Teen Pregnancy Is Put at $7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1996, at All.
215. See KozoL, supra note 1 (describing bleak lives of some children, with touching
insights of their frustrations, despair, and hopes).
216. See Ira Berkow, An Athlete Is Dead at 17 and No One Can Say Why , N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1995, § 8, at 1 ("Suicide has become one of the major causes of death among American teen-agers. In 1992 . .. 1,847 teens killed themselves, which is 10.8 for every 100,000.")
217. See Fox Butterfield, Crime Continues to Decline, but Experts Warn of Coming
'Storm ' of Juvenile Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, § 1, at 18 (discussing the interaction
between juvenile violence and high unemployment rates).
218. See GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 232.
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rates are higher by far, sometimes doubled, sometimes tripled or
higher. "219
If we are going to stop the downward spiral of many of our children,
we need to teach them, among other things, high emotional intelligence
skills. Unfortunately, simply providing a child with an emotional coach
does not ensure that she will develop a healthy sense of herself. Someone
who is adept at engaging others can do so in either a positive or negative
way. 220 As Goleman explains, "Setting the emotional tone of an interaction is, in a sense, a sign of dominance at a deep and intimate level: it
means driving the emotional state of the other person." 221 Thus, a child
whose emotional intelligence is under-developed is at risk of wanting attention, approval, and affection so badly that she may accept it from people
who will not promote her best interest and may even cause her harm. Violent gangs, for example, may offer a place of social acceptance for the emotionally vulnerable child. Consequently, for a child to develop adequate
interpersonal skills and master the art of human relations, she will need to
be surrounded by adults with high intellectual and emotional skills.
B.
1.

Filling the Leadership Void

Teaching our Children not to be Racist

Our children are watching us. They learn about race and race relations from us. As adults, we must be careful not to promote a vision of
social reality that teaches non-White children that they are racially inferior
or that teaches White children that they are racially superior. Accordingly,
as adults, as parents, as educators, we are under a special duty to teach our
children not to be racist. For example, consider Hulond Humphries, Principal of Randolph County High School in Widowee, Alabama, who prohibited interracial couples from attending the school prom. 222 Why did state
officials fail to send the resounding message that intentional racism is intolerable, perhaps by publicly denouncing Principal Humphries for his remarks, or asking for his resignation, or even firing him if an investigation
219. Id. at 232.
220. Id. at 117.
221. Id. This is exactly what Joan Williams offered several years ago as an observation
of the power relationships women have with their children. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MicH. L. REv. 797, 843 (1989). Still, something about this observation should
give us pause.
222. Principal Humphries announced during a school assembly in February that he
would cancel the prom if interracial couples planned to attend. During the same assembly,
he reportedly called a mixed-race student a "mistake." Sue Ann Pressley, Alabama Hamlet's Wounds From Racial Controversy Slow to Heal, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1996, at A3. Parents and civil lights leaders, who planned to take the school board to court to demand
Humphries' dismissal, reached a settlement agreement with the board which forbids Humphries to visit any school in the district during school hours. Ronald Smothers, Once Principal, but Now Barred From All Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at B7.
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warranted it?223 If the principal's policy and remark were unintentional, a
consequence of.his unconscious racism, why was he not remorseful·when it
became apparent to him that he had augmented the racial divide in his
community and the nation? Not only did Mr. Humphries show no signs of
contrition, but he declared his intention to run for Randolph County
School Superintendent in November. 224
Parents, educators, teachers, and people who care about the quality of
our children's lives all want our children to be with responsible adults who
possess high emotional intelligence skills. Consistent with this shared aspiration, we may want to focus on a few specific goals. First, we should give
serious consideration to adopting programs that teach our children about
emotional intelligence. For example, East Rock School in New Haven,
Connecticut, has been experimenting since 1990 with teaching children
emotional intelligence as a way of trying to reduce the chances a child will
end up in "trouble. "225 Early results in the experiment do show a reduction
in sexual promiscuity, fighting, and drop-out rates among students at the
school, but the researchers say it is too soon to tell just how effective the
program is. There is little doubt, however, that not only is school success
largely measured by a child's ability to handle her emotions,Z26 but a child's
self-esteem is inextricably related to achievement in school, as well.Z27
Toward this end, we need to teach our children "self-efficacy," that is,
how to motivate themselves. We can help children learn this by paying
close attention to a child's interests and talents. Rather than being anxious,
angry, or depressed, the child who is able to find his "flow" zone is likely to
be happy and successful. For example, a child who receives encouragement
and praise for developing talents and skills that bring him pleasure (reading, piano playing, running, or whatever), is likely to have an intact selfesteem. He is likely to have a sense of control over his life and will motivate himself to achieve excellence in those areas he loves as well as other
areas he needs to master.228 Moreover, the self-motivated child is better
223. Humphries was not fired by the school board; he was pushed into a new position
as a special consultant to the school board. Pressley, supra note 228. Ironically, Humphries'
new duties include supervising the construction of a building to replace the old Randolph
County High School building, which burned to the ground in an apparent arson during the
controversy over Humphries' remarks. Campaign by Ousted Principal Draws Fire, MoNTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 6, 1996, at 5B.
224. Humphries remained unapologetic throughout the controversy, stating that "he
had no intention of resigning to satisfy troublesome outsiders." Pressley, supra note 222.
225. Daniel Goleman, Teaching Emotional Self Control; Defusing Violence Is Part of
Curriculum in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at B8.
226. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 192. "The classroom, of course, is as much a social
situation as an academic one; the socially awkward child is as likely to misread and rnisrespond to a teacher as to another child. The resulting anxiety and bewilderment can themselves interfere with their ability to learn effectively." !d. at 122.
227. !d. at 274 (quoting Dr. David Hamburg, a psychiatrist: "A child's sense of selfworth depends substantially on his or her ability to achieve in school").
228. !d. at 244.
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prepared to overcome hardships and setbacks than is the child who is motivated to perform in order to escape punishment or secure rewards. 229
Second, we should integrate our schools and communities. Today,
63.2% of our public schools are racially segregated. 230 One-third of all
Black students attend schools that are 90% to 100% minorities (Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Native American).231 Within integrated public schools,
segregation is nevertheless pervasive. "[W]hile black pupils represent 16
percent of all public school students, they make up almost 40 percent of
those who are classed as mentally retarded, disabled, or otherwise deficient."232 Most public school curricula are Eurocentric and provide little, if
any, courses of study that focus on African-American history, culture, or
tradition. 233 Of 27,713 doctoral degrees awarded in 1992, only 1,081 (3.9%)
were earned by Black men and women. 234
Brown had it right: We must integrate our schools because integration
is not just consistent with racial and educational equality principles, it is
essential to them. Some research indicates that for Black students to
achieve at their optimal level, they need to attend schools where Blacks
comprise at least 20% of the population. 235 Other studies indicate that
achievement test scores of Blacks and Whites are closer and show less disparity when the students attend school together. 236 Moreover, integrated
schools where children of all colors work and play together will help promote race relations and may be our best hope for the future of race relations. As Goleman's work indicates:
What can make a difference [to breaking down stereotypes],
though, is a sustained camaraderie and daily efforts toward a common goal by people of different backgrounds. The lesson here is
from school desegregation: when groups fail to mix socially, instead forming hostile cliques, the negative stereotypes intensify.
But when students have worked together as equals to attain a
common goal, as on sports teams or in bands, their stereotypes
break down-as can happen naturally in the workplace, when
people work together as peers over the years.Z37
Accordingly, even if the Jenkins Court believed that the federal judiciary had overstepped its authority by ordering some of the measures that it
did, even if the state did act in good faith, and even if Missouri could not
!d. at 94.
HACKER, supra note 150, at 167.
Kunen, supra, note 108, at 38.
HAcKER, supra note 150, at 168; see also Glennon, supra note 202.
HACKER, supra note 150, at 172.
!d. at 129.
!d. at 171.
powell, supra note 40, at 789.
GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 159 (citing PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM (John F. Davidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds. 1987)).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

EDUCATION & RACE

1997]

45

afford to put more money into the magnet school program, the Court and
the state of Missouri still faced the hardest question posed by Brown: How
do we move beyond the effects of Plessy? Every case that focuses on race,
poverty, and education faces this question. Justice Harlan's hope, our only
hope for "political unity," a value so fundamental to constitutional law and
democratic theory, lies in integrating our public schools and
communities.Z38
For school integration to foster racial camaraderie effectively, the lesson from McLaurin that integration in the classroom is constitutionally required must be taken seriously and curricula must be structured to promote
this goal. Less reliance should be placed on biased testing procedures in
student placements. This should reduce the disproportionately higher percentage of Black children being placed in special education programs.
More effort should be made to integrate "gifted" programs, perhaps looking at a child's multiple-intelligences instead of relying exclusively on math
and verbal mental acuity, as measured by standardized exams. Finally, curricula should focus on including African-American and other cultural
themes not traditionally taught. Learning about different races and cultures affirms all students and teaches all students to respect each other.
2.

Individual and Institutional Responsibility to Promote Racial Equality

The reader may recall the recent incident at Denny's Restaurant when
a number of Black Secret Service agents were made to wait over an hour
for their breakfast while White customers were served immediately.Z39
Goleman tells a related story in his book about a shift manager, Sylvia
Skeeter, at another Denny's Restaurant. 240 Ms. Skeeter witnessed waitresses ignoring a group of Black customers. She described the waitresses
treatment of the customers: "They 'would kind of glare, with their hands on
their hips, and then they'd go back to talking among themselves, like a
black person standing five feet away didn't exist.' "241 The waitresses did
not respond favorably to her when she asked them about it. When she
complained to her supervisor, the supervisor "shrugged off their actions,
saying, 'That's how they were raised, and there's nothing I can do about
it.' "242 Frustrated, but indignant at the blatant racism, Ms. Skeeter quit in
protest over the inequality in treatment of Black customers.243 She also
testified against Denny's in a lawsuit that resulted in a $54 million settlement on behalf of thousands of Black customers. 244
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
GOLEMAN, supra note 20, at 155.

Id.
ld.
ld.
ld.
244. ld.
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· Ms. Skeeter showed remarkable leadership. It is a reminder that what
we do is often more telling than what we say. Ironically and sadly, it took
someone at the lower end of the employment hierarchy to take a stand
against the racist policy of the restaurant. Significantly, Ms. Skeeter is a
Black woman and, like most Black women, probably struggles to overcome
both race and sex discrimination in employment.245 When she quit her position at Denny's, she placed herself at some, perhaps considerable, career
and financial risk.
Contrast the waitress's response to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Jenkins. Emphasizing the Court's understandable eagerness to turn matters of education back to the State, Justice O'Connor would absolve Missouri and the federal judiciary of their constitutional obligations to end
racial segregation and provide a quality education to KCMSD Black students because the continuing racial segregation in KCMSD is due to "myriad factors of human existence. "246 This sounds remarkably like the Plessy
Court when it said that, "If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of
each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals ... [Legislation]
is powerless to eradicate racial instincts ... "247
These excerpts from Jenkins and Plessy give the impression that the
Court is powerless to do anything about the oppression of Blacks by White
society and purport to take a neutral stance on the issue of race relations.
This way of thinking makes the Brown decision peculiar outside of its holding, given the Court's willingness to ignore the actual disparities in per pupil expenditures. In reality, however, the Plessy Court's opinion as well as
more recent race cases in which the Court appears unwilling to acknowledge its influential political and social role are anything but neutral. What
the Court does not acknowledge in either Jenkins or Plessy is the role its
legal analysis plays in shaping social relationships. A decision not to enforce a desegregation order mandated by the Brown Court's interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment is a decision condoning segregation. Consider this quote from Professor McConnell, "It was the Jim Crow legislators in the Southern states (not Plessy) who sought to use legislation to
affect racial instincts-to shore up and intensify racial prejudice that was
245. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139.
246. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). As Professor john a. powell recently
noted, this position of the Court also absolved it of any serious discussion of the reasons for
the continuing segregation in Kansas City schools. "The majority opinion never discussed
the history of housing discrimination, lending bias, public housing construction, federal
home mortgage loan programs, or other contributors to racial segregation." powell, supra
note 40, at 751.
247. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
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not strong enough to produce thoroughgoing apartheid without the assistance of law." 248
Judicial protection of racism is an inadequate and irresponsible response to equal protection claims of racial discrimination. Like Ms.
Skeeter, we each have a responsibility to speak out against racism and use
appropriate displays of power to eradicate it. This responsibility falls especially heavily on public officers and leaders. As Goleman states,
"[E]verything we know about the roots of prejudice and how to fight it
effectively suggests that precisely this attitude-turning a blind eye to acts
of bias-allows discrimination to thrive." 249
Moreover, even if the Court felt stymied by rules of judicial restraint
in Plessy and Jenkins, it nevertheless could have used its institutional position to strongly and unequivocally condemn racism and hold states to their
constitutional duty to comply with Brown. Nothing in the Constitution
prevents Justices from taking positions on issues; Justices often call upon
the legislative and executive branches to take action consistent with their
authorities to right wrongs seen by the Justices from the Bench. For example, former Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Plyler spoke out quite strongly
against the Texas statute that denied undocumented alien children a free
public education. Invoking principles of judicial restraint and federalism,
he said: "Were it [the Court's] business to set the Nation's social policy, I
would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including illegal aliens-of an elementary education."250 It is hard to disagree with the proposition that education of
our children is important. Significantly, on this issue, the Plyler Justices
were all in agreement and not afraid to say so.
Closely related, state and federal legislatures could pass laws aimed at
dismantling racism, especially in education-fairer housing laws,251 and
fairer taxing schemes to finance schools, for example. Indeed, States can
continue to promote racial and educational equality under their own constitutions.Z52 For example, in 1989-21 years after Rodriguez-the Texa&
Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution as requiring "equal educational advantages for all" 253 and ordered the state to adopt a funding
plan that would provide greater parity in per pupil expenditures between

248. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1128.
249. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 158.
250. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
251. powell, supra note 40, at 780.
252. For a discussion of the viability of state constitutions, particularly with regard to
addressing poverty and children's welfare, see Daan Bravemen, Symposium: After the War:
Poverty Law in the 1980's: Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577
(1989).
253. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
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the poorer and wealthier school districts. 254. Other states explicitly provide
in their constitutions for a free quality public education for every child.255
State and federal judges also could interpret laws in ways that promote
racial and educational equality. For example, the federal Constitution does
not require proof of discriminatory intent in equal protection challenges
based on racial discrimination. 256 When the Supreme Court in Washington
v. Davis read this requirement into the law, it ignored the impossibility of
meeting such a burden.257 Moreover, the intent requirement suggests that
individuals are responsible for the discriminatory practice, which has at
least two consequences. First, "blaming" individuals for institutional racism understandably promotes a perceived need for the allegedly racist individuals to defend themselves against such charges. Most people probably
do not think of themselves as racist and certainly would not think of themselves as intentionally racist. Rather than being motivated to make individual contributions to end racial discrimination and promote racial equality,
individuals who get blamed, however indirectly, for institutional racism
may be more sympathetic to cries like those of Allan Bakke's of being
innocent (White) victims in the context of affirmative action policies that
they believe decrease their own opportunities. Significantly, this shifting of
blame and responsibility for institutional racism onto individuals also ignores the harm caused by institutional racism, 258 which raises the second
point.
As Professor john a. powell observed, the emphasis on individual responsibility obviates any need to inquire into the institutional racism behind the resulting harm.259 Professor powell states, "Current formalist
legal analysis fails to recognize state action as the culmination and combination of the policies and actions of school, housing, and other city and
state officials taken together. This combination causes racial and economic
254. /d. But see JoNATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 223-29 (1991) (describing
the inevitable delays in implementing such a policy and suggesting that 23 years after Rodriguez "the children of the poorest people in the state of Texas still are waiting for an equal
chance at education").
255. See, e.g., N.J. CaNsT. Art. 8, § 4, <{1 ("The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years."); N.H.
CaNsT. Pt. 2, Art. 83 ("it shall be the duty of the legislators ... , in all future periods of this
government, to cherish the interest of literature and sciences, and all seminaries and public
schools . . . "); see also powell, supra note 40, at 761-62.
256. See generally Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MicH. L. REv. 953, 961-65
(1993) (exploring relationship between discriminatory intent requirement and colorblind
rhetoric).
257. powell, supra note 40, at 771 ("In addition to disregarding reality, this presumption makes it more difficult for families in poor, segregated neighborhoods and schools to
tell their stories and to right the wrong of segregation.") (footnote omitted).
258. See id. at 758 (discussing how urban segregation isolates Blacks not only from
Whites, but also from quality education, health care, and jobs).
259. /d. at 768-69.
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segregation in America's schools and communities."260 As a society committed to equality, we must accept that there are connections between socioeconomic status and race. If this reality were acknowledged by
institutions like the Supreme Court, they would be able to examine questions like educational equality in ways that promote holistic solutions to
underlying systemic problems. If the Court and others involved in education were to acknowledge that poverty and segregation are related, then
they might also acknowledge that the question of educational equality is
not one of equal funding oR integration, but rather one of equal funding
AND integration. Seeing the connection between poverty and racism and
trying to resolve the whole problem will promote educational and racial
equality.
Finally, judges, legislators, policy makers, and others need to foster an
understanding that the colorblind rhetoric that currently influences at least
three Supreme Court Justices, some political leaders, and perhaps many
citizens, is, at best, an ideal at this point in our history. We are not yet at a
point where color is ignored.261 Holding off promotion of or rejecting the
colorblind rhetoric altogether and valuing our differences would make it
easier to understand the continuing need for such things as redistricting
plans that empower Black voters. 262 It also would allow for the continuing
support of affirmative integration policies. Such policies and efforts toward
.achieving racial equality have contributed to accomplishing coiiL.-rnon goals
such as securing the 1996 Summer Olympic Games for the city of Atlanta,
home of the Civil Rights Movement.263 Moreover, the Atlanta business
community worked closely with the Olympic Committee to ensure that
construction contractors, and vending and purchasing contractors had a significant minority participation. "As of March, 32 percent of the committee's $387 million in procurement contracts had been granted to minority
companies, including 35 percent of the $297 million spent on design and
construction." 264 The effort is seen by the Atlanta community as providing
260. Id. at 769.
261. See Gotanda, supra note 147; see also Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, 1990
DuKE L.J. 758 (exploring the value of critical race theory to legal analysis); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991) (arguing that
race has a social significance that continues to harm Blacks and other Americans of color,
and that although the legal strategy of colorblindness achieved victories in the past, it is now
an impediment to greater racial equality).
262. The Supreme Court recently struck down redistricting plans of Texas, in Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996), and of North Carolina, in Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
On a positive note, the Court in Vera pointed out "the irony that the price of imposing a
principle of colorblindness in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment would be submerging the votes of those whom the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to
protect." 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2010 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the constitutionality of racial gerrymandering and its alternatives, see LANI GurNIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
263. Kevin Sack, Atlanta Leaders See Racial Goals as Olympic Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 1996, at AI.
264. !d.
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"a lasting legacy of biracial business relationships." 265 Sponsoring the
Olympics boosted our national pride and promoted a sense of national
community. Just as affirmative integration policies like those in the Atlanta business community promoted positive race relations, such policies
also are instrumental in integrating educational institutions where admissions are made by selection committees.
The list of ideas is infinite and there are many people and institutions
working toward these and other goals. Notwithstanding these efforts, it is
easy at times to be discouraged and to wonder if Professor Derrick Bell is
right that "racism is here to stay." 266 Personally, I do not want to agree
with Professor Bell because it is too painful to think he may be right. Yet a
White person could not spend a day or a week in the life of a person of
color without coming to the realization that racism is pervasive, something
people of color know all too well. I am utterly shocked at some of the
incidents my daughter has endured. One is so unbelievable that I want to
share it and hope that it makes some kind of an impression about how
pernicious racism is. This story also relates to the final specific suggestion I
want to make in this article about what we can do to begin to dismantle
racism.
3.

The Value of an Apology as an Equitable Remedy

On October 13, 1995, my daughter and I were waiting at Boston's Logan International Airport for a connecting flight. Like any six-year-old,
she was exploring under seats and checking out the waiting area. While she
was off getting a drink of water, a White woman set her luggage in the chair
next to me and went to check in. When she returned to her luggage, she sat
down to wait for her plane. She had been sitting less than two minutes
when her flight was called. As she gathered her things, she noticed that her
purse was missing and frantically asked for help. We looked around for
about ten seconds, but were unable to find it. She then declared, "I bet
that Black kid took it." My daughter was the only child and the only Black
person in the waiting area. I was stunned and immediately responded, "I'm
sorry, but you are talking about my daughter. My daughter is not a thief. I
bet you left your bag at the counter." The woman did not say anything to
me at first, but went to the counter and found her bag. She rushed past me
to catch her flight and, as she was heading out the door, look backed and
exclaimed, "It's Friday the 13th. What do you expect?"
How about an apology?, I thought. This time, fortunately, my daughter did not hear what was said about her and will not have to carry around

265. !d.
266. Derrick Bell, Jr., Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 How. L.J. 79 (1991).
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in her memory a stranger's perception of her as a purse thief. 267 Sometimes I wonder how parents of children of color survive these kinds of emotional assaults. It is heartbreaking to see your child discriminated against
over and over again. If mothers, fathers, and other loved ones are constantly fighting back tears, fighting for our children's rights, what must our
children be feeling? While many parents of color undoubtedly understand
the pain of racism from a child's perspective because of their own experiences, they must wonder with dismay at how and why the racism persists
into the childhoods of their own children. How are parents and other concerned people to understand how children can be mistreated? Moreover, if
my daughter suffers the hurt of racism almost daily just going to her safe,
middle-class elementary school in a sleepy, university town, imagine how .
children of color who are struggling with poverty, violence, and neglected
schools must steel themselves against racism just to get through the day.
How is any child of color supposed to understand race discrimination?
How is any White child who witnesses it supposed to understand?
If the woman in the airport who accused my daughter of being a purse
thief had apologized to me and acknowledged the harm her racism caused,
I would have felt better about the incident. If she had not been in a hurry
to catch her plane, her apology also would have opened up the possibility
for further discussion between us about race. Chances are good that we
both would have felt better if that discussion had occurred. In the remainder of this article, I want to suggest some ways in which another type of
apology-made by the Federal Government-could help stimulate a productive national conversation about race relations.
I do not think the government has ever apologized for slavery, the
continuing effects of slavery, and persistent racial inequality.268 Recently,

267. When she is old enough to read this, she probably will not be interested enough in
her mom's work to bother. But if she does read this, she will be old enough to talk about
what happened.
268. Our country has struggled with the issue of reparations for slavery for a long time,
primarily in the context of damage awards. In 1886, Congress actually passed a bill to compensate 4 million former slaves, but the bill was vetoed by President Johnson. Calvin J.
Allen, The Continuous Quest of African Americans to Obtain Reparations for Slavery,
NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAo., May/June 1995, at 33. The bill called for confiscation of confederate property to be used to provide "40 acres and a mule" to each former slave. !d. The 1995
total value of the "40 acres and a mule" compensation is between $300 and $500 billion. !d.
This legislation inspired the notable actor, director, and film maker Spike Lee, who often
deals with race issues in his work, to name his production company, "40 Acres and a Mule"
Productions.
·
Black plaintiffs have also unsuccessfully sought damage awards for racism since Reconstruction. For example, in the 1915 "Cotton Tax" case, Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 U .S.
App. D.C. 440, 441 (1916), aff'd, 244 U.S. 643 (1917), plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of
Treasury for reparations of $68 million, the value of slave labor used to produce cotton that
the government taxed. Allen, supra, at 33. The case was dismissed by the U.S. District
Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision. !d. See also Rhonda
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Black plaintiffs sued the government seeking, among other relief, an official apology along these lines.269 The Ninth Circuit dismissed their case
because the panel of judges said the plaintiffs had not been specific enough
in their complaint about the wrongs they suffered.270 The Court then went
on to say that they had no jurisdiction to issue an apology. 271
Black plaintiffs have brought other cases seeking apologies for racism.272 Whether it is the role of the federal judiciary to issue the apology
is an interesting legal question only from the standpoint of whether such an
apology would "speak" for the government. Issuing an apology to victims
of racism is a modest, but nevertheless powerful and reasonable equitable
remedy and ought to be within a judge's inherent power. As a matter of
civility and human kindness, however, how much harm would it do for a
judge to say that he or she is sorry that the plaintiffs feel wronged, even if
the judge's apology has to be qualified as unofficial? Cases exist where
judges express their sympathy with the plaintiffs even though the judges
V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863 (1993)
(providing a historical overview of Black reparations movement).
One of the most memorable public demands for reparations since Brown came from
James Forman in 1969 who interrupted services at New York's Riverside Church to promote
a "Black Manifesto," calling for churches and synagogues to contribute $500 million for
reparations to African-Americans for slavery. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Dissection of a
Dream, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 157 (1974) (reviewing BoRIS BrrrKER, THE CAsE FOR
BLACK REPARATIONS (1973)). In his book, Professor Bittker concludes that damage
awards for harm caused by slavery are unrealistic, but he does suggest ways for Blacks to
recover for more recent injuries, like the continuing segregation following Brown. Magee
recently criticized Bittker for failing to acknowledge the "considerable moral and emotional
power from the 'super-wrong' propagated by the institution of slavery, and any presentation
of the case for reparations which concedes the impracticality of remedying the injury caused
by slavery has likely dealt itself a near-fatal blow." Magee, supra, at 901 (footnote omitted).
Professor Mari J. Matsuda has also suggested ways to make restitution for racism in her
article Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 323 (1987). See also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of
Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597 (1993).
An apology can have a healing effect, but, as this brief historical overview shows, it will
not compensate victims of racism for their harm and thus, it is only the beginning of the
healing process.
269. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995). The Cato court, however, did acknowledge that "discrimination and bigotry of any type is intolerable, and the
enslavement of Africans by this Country is inexcusable," showing that it had some sympathy
for the plaintiff's injury, but not enough to issue an apology. Id.
270. Id. at 1109.
271. Id. at 1111 (holding "the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate
forum for this relief').
272. See Jenifer Warren, Demanding Repayment For Slavery, L.A. TIMEs, July 6, 1994
(reporting that with support of the Rev. Jesse Jackson and Coretta Scott King, "dozens" of
lawsuits seeking reparations for slavery have been filed, including one (filed by Valena Conley) seeking $100 million in damages and a formal apology from the United States); see also
Group Asking Reparations for Blacks Meets in Michigan , BALTIMORE SUN, July 24, 1994, at
3A (reporting that several hundred people attended annual convention for N'COBRA, or
the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America, and that some group members
"just want a formal apology").
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have been unable to give the plaintiffs all they seek. By pretending that we
(judges and other members of society) do not know what Black plaintiffs
mean or that we are otherwise powerless to acknowledge their requests
when they say they want White society to apologize for the harm it has
done to them is to lose an opportunity to begin healing. As we debate the
propriety of issuing judicial apologies, we should not let the main point get
lost: Blacks want and deserve, at a minimum, an apology for slavery and
for the concomitant persistent racial inequality in society.Z73
There is precedent set by Congress and the President to apologize on
behalf of our nation for past racial wrongs of government policy. For example, Congress passed legislation in 1988 establishing a $1.25 billion trust
fund to pay $20,000 in reparations to each of the 120,000 Japanese-Americans interned during World War II.Z74 The legislation also called for the
issuance of "individual apologies" to the victims. At the signing of the bill,
President Reagan said, "[W]e must recognize that the internment.. was .. a
mistake.'m5 President Bush also apologized for the internment, stating
that the government's policy "offends our own principles of justice."276
There is also precedent by private groups to apologize to Blacks for
past racist policy. Members of the Southern Baptist Convention passed a
resolution apologizing to and asking forgiveness of "all African Americans" for its racist policy and resolving to "repent of racism of which we
have been guilty."277 Pope John Paul II has issued several apologies over
the years for the Catholic Church's role in past racism. 278 Ralph Reed,
273. African-Americans are not alone in their search for an apology for racism. As
South Africa moved away from Apartheid in the early 1990s, many (including Black leader
Archbishop Desmond Tutu) called for an apology on behalf of the government from President F. W. de Klerk. Christopher S. Wren, South Africa and Apartheid: No Apologies, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, §4, at 2. He was unwilling at that time to apologize for apartheid,
despite the fact that Afrikaner leaders felt that it was critical in "[restoring] meaningful
relations between blacks and whites." !d. Some claim that de Klerk feared that an apology
would cost him politically (by losing white votes) and could lead to calls for the payment of
reparations to blacks. Id. de Klerk ultimately apologized, which was seen as a necessary
first step of the healing process. Louis Freedberg, Many Reject Amnesty for Apartheid,
South Africans Say Healing Takes More than Apologies, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1994, at Al;
see also 'We are Sorry' About Apartheid, De Klerk Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Oct. 10,
1992, at A10 ('"For too long we clung to a dream of separated nation-states when it was
already clear that it could not succeed,' de Klerk said in the conservative central town of
Wmburg. 'For that we are sorry."').
274. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
Blacks have been unsuccessful in winning damage awards for racism. See supra note 268.
275. Julie Johnson, President Signs Law to Redress Wartime Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1988, at A16.
276. See President to Express Regret on Internments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at D20
(quoting from draft of President Bush's speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the
attack on Pearl Harbor).
277. Gustav Niebuhr, Baptist Group Votes to Repent for Stand on Slaves, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 21, 1995, at A2.
278. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Pope Apologizes to Africans for Slavery, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1985, at A3 ("[apologizing] to black ..<\frica for the involvement of white Christians
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director of the Christian Coalition, acknowledged that his organization
must "'make racial conciliation a major priority'" if it is to have a "'morally resonant voice.' " 279
Following these precedents, the President and Congress could issue an
apology to Blacks for slavery and for the persistence of pervasive racial
inequality in American society.28 For example, President Clinton recently
turned his attention (and that of federal law enforcement officials) to a
series of arson fires in Southern Black churches.281 President Clinton acknowledged the racial motivation for the fires and "called on the nation to
'show the forces of hatred they cannot win.' " 282 While legislation, backed
by Congress and the White House (similar to that passed to apologize to
the Japanese-Americans interned during World War II), seems like the
most appropriate vehicle for an apology about slavery and the persistence
of racial inequality, the President seems to have missed an important opportunity to take action himself.
The exact scope of an official government apology might be uncertain
until it is given careful reflection by top administrators and government
officials. At a minimum, the apology could express our nation's deep regret and remorse for slavery. Ideally, however, the apology would also include an expression of regret and remorse over the racial inequality that
still pervades our society. The purpose of such a broad ranging apology is
to signal recognition that racial inequality did not end with emancipation
nor with the demise of Jim Crow segregation.

°

in the slave trade"). The Pope has also apologized for other wrongs like religious intolerance, see Celestine Bohlen, Pope Asks Czechs to Forgive Sectarian Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1995, at A3 ("[A]imed at healing a centuries-old legacy of religious wars and hatreds, [Pope] asked forgiveness for the wrongs committed... against Protestants and people
of other faiths."), and oppression of women, see Kenneth L. Woodward, Who's Sorry Now? ,
NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995, at 65 ("[Pope apologizes to] 'every woman' in the world ...
acknowledging that women 'have often been relegated to the margins of society and even
reduced to servitude ... for this I am truly sorry."').
279. Bob Herbert, Burning Their Bridges, TAMPA TRIB., June 21, 1996, at A19. Mr.
Reed's comments are a reaction to the recent spate of arson fires in southern Black
churches.
280. It is important to recognize that other minority groups who have suffered racial
and ethnic discrimination could also benefit from an official government apology addressing
the injustices they have faced as well as the inequality that they continue to encounter. I
have limited my discussion here to the relevance of an apology to African-Americans, primarily because of the stark racial divisiveness that currently exists between Black and White
Americans.
281. Todd S. Purdum, President and Governors Confer on Fires, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1996, at A9. Burning down Black churches is particularly pernicious given the role of the
church in African-American history and culture that extends beyond religious significance
into the political, social, and economic realms. For a fuller discussion of the role of the
church in African-American history and culture, see C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H.
MAMIY A, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990).
282. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Calls on the Nation to Defy 'Forces of Hatred', N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1996, at B7.
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Regardless of whether some Americans believe there is a connection
between slavery and current racial inequality, many sound and positive reasons exist for our legislators and President to issue an official broad ranging
apology to African-Americans. First, as a society we are at an impasse on
racial equality issues. This impasse may be partly attributable to confusion
among Whites, many of whom are people of good will, about the relationship between slavery and continuing racial inequality. This confusion need
not be resolved in order for an official apology to have value. Indeed, an
apology might help skeptical Whites recognize dimensions of slavery and
racial inequality that they had previously ignored, thereby helping White
and Black Americans move beyond the current impasse toward a more
constructive conversation about racial equality.
Whenever people get caught up in arguing who is "right" or who
speaks the "truth" on a particular issue, communications tend to break
down to such a point that eventually one side will "stonewall" or just stop
participating.283 In the context of a marriage, this would spell doom or
divorce; the parties would go separate ways in order to survive the emotional pain and move on with their lives. In the context of racial relations,
we cannot afford to get to this point. Yet, many government leaders' denials that race discrimination is a current phenomenon has them on a path of
disregarding Blacks' concerns. Assuming we want an open dialogue about
how to achieve healthy race relations, White society has to acknowledge
that race discrimination is an ongoing problem.
Second, an official government proclamation apologizing for slavery
and persistent racial inequality sets a tone for everyone to follow. If Con·gress and the President are behind the effort, it will send a message that our
nation is seriously committed to achieving equality for all people- a principle that is hard to dispute. Indeed, the government itself might be more
motivated to adopt policies consistent with its public commitment. In addition, organizations and individuals who fail to see the value in the Southern
Baptist Convention's or the Pope's apologies to Blacks may be more willing to follow the lead of the President and Congress.
Third, if the government acknowledges that race relations need to be
improved and that White society has to do more toward achieving racial
equality, then the healing process can begin. Working together maximizes
the chances for creative and successful solutions. Working together, in and
of itself, will help bridge the racial divide. For example, the private apology

283. GoLEMAN, supra note 20, at 136.
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from the Southern Baptist Convention to Blacks resulted in commendations of leadership,284 positive calls for action,285 and hope for future improved race relations. 286
The potential healing effect of an apology for an individual can be
quite significant. Recently, Margaret Bergmann Lambert received an invitation to be Germany's National Olympic Committee's guest of honor at
the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta. 287 The invitation was extended as
an apology and "form of reparation" for the suffering she endured as a
result of Nazi German's racist policy to bar Jewish athletes from the 1936
Olympics in Berlin.288 Ms. Lambert was the favorite for a gold medal in
the women's high jump, and won the U.S. Championship in that event in
1937 after immigrating to the United States and vowing she would never
return to Germany. 289 Understandably, being excluded from the Berlin
Olympics was only part of her anger; she and her family, along with millions of Jews, suffered because of the terrorism and murders committed by
the Nazi regime during the Holocaust. So why accept the invitation now
after she has tried to forget the past? Her presence will be a reminder to
young people of the anti-semitism and evil of Hitler's Germany, she
says. 290 Equally important, "I thought that going to Atlanta as the guest of
honor of the German Olympic committee would be good for my mental
outlook. It will make the ghosts of the past a little less unfriendly." 291 Ms.
Lambert's gracious acceptance of Germany's invitation tells us it is never
too late to apologize and that an apology is important to the healing
process.
Fourth, imagine the profound impact we could have on our children by
renewing our commitment to achieving racial equality. Perhaps the one
place where this could best be shown is in our schools for all the reasons
discussed in this article. We owe each child an opportunity to develop a
healthy self-esteem. This means instilling in our children a sense of selfworth and a sense of belonging to a nation that is committed to ensuring
they succeed.Z92 As today's children become healthy and happy adults,
they will ensure the success of the next generation. A nation as wealthy as
ours can afford to feed, house, nurture, and educate all of its children. A
284. Carl Rowan, Courageous Southern Baptists Deserve Blessing of America, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, June 23, 1995, at 31.
285. Deborah Mathis, Baptists' Apology is Just a Start, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, June
25, 1995, at J7.
286. Baptists' Apology Helps Old Racial Wounds Heal, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., June 22,
1995, at A10.
287. Ira Berkow, An Olympic Invitation that is 60 Years Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1996, at Al.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at B14.
292. KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
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nation as great as ours should care about its children and tend to their
welfare.
Finally, an official apology to the Black community is the right thing to
do. As long as White society denies the pervasive racial inequality in society, the racial anger will augment, and the divide will grow. Consistent
with human nature, anyone who has been wronged feels better just having
that acknowledged. In fact, without that recognition, healing may be impossible or may take much longer than would otherwise be necessary. Admittedly, more than an apology is needed to repair the damage done to
Blacks because of racial discrimination. An official apology is merely a
starting point, but it is an opportune way to renew our commitment to racial equality and begin racial healing.
CoNcLusioN
"When I dream, I dream of growing up to be alive. "293
We must remain committed to ending racism-we owe it to all of our
children. We also must remain committed to educating our children because this may be their best way to avoid the traps that currently pull at
them and shape many of their lives. We can begin to end racism and also
help our children stay out of trouble by giving them a quality, integrated
education and by teaching them emotional intelligence skills.
I have explored a number of major Supreme Court cases focusing on
education and have suggested that our commitment as a nation to integrated public schools is waning. Closely related to our declining commitment to integrated schools, is our lack of commitment to providing a
quality education to all children. Recent cases indicate that the current
Supreme Court is less committed than was the Brown Court in interpreting
the equal protection clause in ways that promote racial ~nd educational
equality. Specifically, the Court requires proof of racial animus in analyzing school policies that have the effect of promoting racial segregation; it
invalidates affirmative action policies aimed at integrating educational institutions; it ignores the connection between race and poverty, thereby allowing school financing schemes that allow for gross disparities in
educational resources between White schools and schools attended primarily by students of color; some Justices have adopted the theory that the
Constitution is colorblind, thereby ensuring the existing White power structure and concomitant racial inequality are likely to stay in place; and the
Court has allowed at least one local government to "buy its way out of" its
obligation to integrate by spending as much (or even more) on its Black
schools than it does on its White schools even though the Black students
293. Oprah Winfrey (quoting young Black girl) (ABC television broadcast, December
20, 1995).
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continue to suffer the racial stigma that motivated the Brown Court to order integration of our public schools.
At present, we are a racially divided nation. We must begin to acknowledge the wounds institutional racism inflicts on people of color and
the ultimate toll it takes on our political unity. This article explores,
through the concept of emotional intelligence, several ways in which we
can better understand some of the dynamics of racism. It offers hope that
we can break through the current impasse on race relations and renew our
commitment to achieving racial equality.
Thus, although the question of how to integrate our public schools is
not easy to resolve, I suggest that integrating the schools is both necessary
and essential if we are ever to achieve racial equality. Recent cases in
which the Court seems to have given up on this goal, then, actually present
the real challenge to a society that rejected de jure segregation but remains
segregated as a matter of fact. Getting rid of Jim Crow was the easy part
for a society committed to racial equality; now we face the tough test: How
do we move beyond involuntary de facto segregation in an effective way?
Now is not the time to give up, but rather it is time to join together and give
true meaning to the concept of racial equality. We owe it to ourselves and
to our children.

